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ABSTRACT
Courts have long been skeptical about the use of expert witnesses in copyright cases. More
than four decades ago, and before Congress extended copyright law to protect computer
software, the Ninth Circuit in Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp. ruled that expert
testimony was inadmissible to determine whether Mayor McCheese and the merry band of
McDonald’s characters infringed copyright protection for Wilhelmina W. Witchiepoo and the
other imaginative H.R. Pufnstuf costumed characters. Since the emergence of software copyright
infringement cases in the 1980s, substantially all software copyright cases have permitted expert
witnesses to aid juries in understanding software code. As the Second Circuit recognized in
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., the ordinary observer standard “may well have
served its purpose when the material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily
comprehensible and generally familiar to the average lay person,” but as to computer programs,
district courts must have “discretion . . . to decide to what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding
the highly technical nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given case.”
In a shocking departure from the decisions of every other circuit that has confronted
software copyright infringement litigation, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed and applied the bar on
expert testimony originating in Krofft Television Productions to all copyright disputes, including those
involving highly technical computer software code. The court in Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
held that lay juries must decipher and analyze software code—distinct hexadecimal assembly
code languages for different processors—without the assistance of expert witnesses, a rule that
the authoring judge characterized at the oral argument as “nutty.”
The Ninth Circuit’s rule overlooks the key distinction between the use of technical experts
to analyze substantial similarity as opposed to enabling lay judges and jurors to perceive the
underlying works. Just as it would be absurd to ask a lay jury with no familiarity with Kanji
characters to assess whether a translation of HARRY POTTER AND THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE
into Japanese infringed the English original without the aid of a bilingual translator, it makes no
sense to ask a non-technical jury to compare computer source codes written in different assembly
languages to determine substantial similarity without expert assistance. We contend, consistent
with the views of every court outside of the Ninth Circuit that has addressed the issue, that courts
should permit the use of technical experts to enable lay judges and juries to perceive the meaning
of computer languages and computer code.
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INTRODUCTION

Copyright law has long relied on the views of lay audiences to assess the
critical infringement question: whether the defendant’s work is substantially
similar to protected elements of the plaintiff’s work of authorship. The
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial reinforces lay juries’ role in resolving
copyright cases. For much of U.S. history, lay jurors were capable of
comparing literary and artistic works through direct observation of the
manuscripts, pictures, and sculptures. Copyright law achieved a democratic
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character. Subject to the jury instructions regarding the contours of the law, a
diverse group of lay people assesses infringement if either party so requests.
Consequently, courts have long been skeptical about the use of expert
witnesses in copyright cases. Courts have long allowed experts to assist in the
objective assessment of which aspects of the copyrighted work are protectable.
All the same, courts have also prohibited experts from assisting the fact-finder
in comparing the works in question to determine substantial similarity of
protected expression—the subjective or intrinsic inquiry. With the extension
of copyright protection to computer software, however, the Second Circuit
recognized that while the ordinary observer standard “may well have served its
purpose when the material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily
comprehensible and generally familiar to the average lay person,” district
courts must have “discretion . . . to decide to what extent, if any, expert
opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer programs, is
warranted in a given case.”1 Most other circuits to confront software copyright
cases came to the same conclusion.2
In a shocking departure from the decisions of every other circuit that has
confronted software copyright infringement litigation, the Ninth Circuit has
continued to bar expert testimony on the intrinsic test in cases involving highly
technical computer software code. It held in Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc. that
lay juries must decipher and analyze software code—distinct hexadecimal3
assembly code languages for different processors—without the assistance of

1. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834–35 (10th Cir.
1993) (“[W]e decline to set forth any strict methodology for the abstraction of computer
programs. . . . [W]e foresee that the use of experts will provide substantial guidance to the
court in applying an abstractions test.”).
3. Hexadecimal provides a convenient way of representing binary information, which
is very important for computer systems. Computer systems store information in arrays of on/
off switches. Thus, the basic unit of information in computer systems is a binary digit (“0” or
“1”) or “bit.” See generally Bit, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bit (last visited Aug.
29, 2020). Hexadecimal features a base of sixteen symbols (“0”–”9,” “A”–“F”) as opposed to
the more common decimal (“0”–”9”) system. See generally Hexadecimal, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hexadecimal (last visited Aug. 29, 2020). Hence, hexadecimal symbols
provide a human-friendly representation of binary-coded values. Each hexadecimal digit
represents four binary digits, also known as a “nibble,” which is half a byte. A “byte” is a unit
of digital information that most commonly consists of eight bits. See generally Byte, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byte (last visited Aug. 29, 2020). Historically, the byte was the
number of bits used to encode a single character of text in a computer and for this reason was
the smallest addressable unit of memory in many computer architectures. For example, a single
byte can have values ranging from 00000000 to 11111111 in binary form, which can be
conveniently represented as 00 to FF in hexadecimal.
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expert witnesses,4 a rule that the authoring judge characterized at the oral
argument as “nutty.”5
This Article explores the role of technical experts in copyright cases. Part
II traces the history of expert witness skepticism in copyright infringement
analysis. Part III discusses the departure from that skepticism in software
copyright cases in most circuit courts. Part IV surveys the Ninth Circuit’s
unusual infringement jurisprudence. Part V then extensively and critically
examines Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc, which prohibited the use of expert
witness testimony to assist a jury deciphering complex computer languages.
Part VI contends the time is long overdue for the Ninth Circuit, home to much
of the computer software industry, to join the chorus of other circuits that
allows expert witnesses to assist juries in perceiving complex computer
programs.
II.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EXPERT WITNESS
SKEPTICISM

The earliest use of expert testimony in adversarial common law litigation
is usually traced back to 1782 and Chief Justice Mansfield’s famed decision in
Folkes v. Chadd.6 Scholars have long regarded this case as having developed the
“foundation” for the rules governing expert witnesses.7 Folkes was a property
dispute, and the witnesses involved in the case were primarily engineers. In
permitting the court to receive their testimony, Justice Mansfield developed
the position that the opinions of experts when “formed on facts was very
proper evidence.”8 Even though Folkes was not a copyright case, Justice
Mansfield’s role in it is noteworthy given his prominence at the time, especially
in the world of copyright law.9
By the turn of the nineteenth century, it appears to have become fairly
common for litigants in English music copyright cases to present the court
with the testimony of experts. The 1835 decision in D’Almaine v. Boosey is a
perfect example.10 The facts involved an operatic composition assigned to the
plaintiff, which the defendant had copied and published but with some
4. See Antonick v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2016).
5. Infra note 197.
6. See Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782).
7. See, e.g., Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 879, 887 (2008).
8. Folkes, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590.
9. Judge Mansfield had decided in 1769 the celebrated case of Millar v. Taylor. See 98
Eng. Rep. 291 (1769).
10. D’Almaine v. Boosey, 160 Eng. Rep. 117 (1835).
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significant substantive embellishments.11 Among other arguments, the
defendant claimed that these embellishments rendered his work an altogether
different one and thus his publication non-piratical.12 In support of their
claims, both the plaintiff and defendant relied on affidavits from “experienced
musician[s],” which the court accepted as entirely unproblematic.13 Perhaps
more importantly, in finding for the plaintiff the court itself granted relief on
a prior (unnamed) decision dealing with musical compositions, and noted how
that prior decision was significant because it was based on the views of the
famed musician and composer “Sir George Smart, who was a witness in the
case.”14
It remains unclear when U.S. courts developed a regularized sense of
comfort with expert testimony in copyright matters. What we do know is that
they seem to have largely followed the English model of allowing experts in
cases involving musical compositions. The court adopted and followed the
English case of D’Almaine in the notable case Jollie v. Jaques.15 A decision of the
federal district court in New York, the case involved a matter largely similar to
D’Almaine, and the court was called upon to examine whether the defendant’s
work was an infringement of the plaintiff’s despite having added multiple
variations.16 Relying on the English precedent, the court denied the plaintiff’s
request for an injunction. Important for us though is the fact that in support
of its argument the defendant presented the testimony of “an expert, who had
examined and compared the two pieces of music.”17 The court accepted this
testimony as uncontroversial, in almost identical manner as the court had in
D’Almaine.
A federal district court adopted a similar approach a few years prior to
Jollie. In Reed v. Carusi,18 the plaintiff alleged an infringement of the copyright
in its ballad, a musical composition. As part of its unsuccessful defense, the
defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s work was itself drawn from a prior
source—and to support this claim the defendant introduced the testimony of

11. See id. at 118–21.
12. See id. at 122.
13. Id. at 118–19.
14. Id. at 123.
15. Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850). For an excellent discussion
of the substantive issue involved in both D’Almaine and Jollie, see Joseph P. Fishman, Music as
a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1877–79 (2018).
16. See Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 913–14.
17. Id. at 913.
18. Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431 (C.C.D. Md. 1845).
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various experts in music, which was delivered to the jury without any
documented controversy.19
Neither of the two leading copyright treatises from the nineteenth
century—Curtis on Copyright and Drone on Copyright—however, address the issue
directly.20 All the same, neither expresses any disagreement with the English
cases that rely on the affidavits of experts, or with the U.S. cases that adopt a
similar approach.
Eaton S. Drone, in particular, spends a good amount of time describing
the test for “piracy,” i.e., copyright infringement, where the use of experts has
since become a matter of controversy. Recognizing that the comparison of the
works is usually a laborious and time-intensive process that entails a complex
analysis of the two works, Drone notes how “[i]n the United States, the usual
practice in cases involving much labor has been to make a reference to a
master.”21 He further notes that “[t]he master may be required not only to
report the facts, but also to give his opinion as to whether the plaintiff’s work
is original, and whether it has been infringed by the defendant.”22 While this
account tracks the modern practice of a court-appointed expert or master, it is
nevertheless telling in two respects. First, it involves the court—rather than
the parties—directly relying on the master. And second, the rationale for such
reliance, in Drone’s view, was not expertise over subject-matter but rather the
labor and time involved in undertaking a scrutiny and comparison of the
works, which was seemingly unworthy of the court’s attention at the time. This
suggests that treatise-writers and perhaps courts as well hardly saw nineteenthcentury U.S. copyright law as requiring specific expertise beyond knowledge
of the doctrine and the standard legal principles and methods of argumentation
and reasoning commonly deployed. A comparison of the works—however
complex—was a matter of perception, which required little more than time
and patience and was entirely a question of fact and judgment internal to a
court’s ordinary role.
To the extent that such expertise was required or allowed, it seems to have
been relegated to the domain of music. This trend continued through the
nineteenth century and into the early part of the twentieth century. The
developmental jurisprudence around the law relating to infringement of
musical works routinely contains references to expert reports, testimony, and
19. See id. at 432.
20. See generally EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS (1879); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHT (1847).
21. DRONE, supra note 20, at 513.
22. Id. at 514.
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affidavits presented to courts for proof of copying.23 And while courts for the
most part relied on the notion of the “average ear,” they nevertheless appear
to have somewhat routinely allowed expert opinions to influence their views
on originality and copying.
As copyright litigation matured, savvy litigants and their lawyers attempted
to cloak perceptibility with the need for expertise that was well beyond
something a judge ordinarily possessed. In so doing, they implicitly pushed the
idea that courts should make use of expert witnesses with knowledge of the
subject-matter at issue in the lawsuit, a claim that went well beyond music. In
the late 1920s, Moses Malevinsky, counsel to Anne Nichols in the seminal case
of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,24 sought to offer his own scientific theory
as the basis for assessing similarity of dramatic works, a theory which he had
published as a freestanding monograph at the time of the litigation.25 While
acknowledging Malevinsky’s “deep study of the technical construction of plays
and motion pictures,” District Judge Henry Goddard concluded that
Malevinsky’s theory called for a “new test, or at least a new method of
approach” that impermissibly would extend protection to ideas.26 On appeal,
Judge Learned Hand was especially skeptical of the use of experts to aid the
court in judging copyright infringement:
We cannot approve the length of the record, which was due chiefly
to the use of expert witnesses. Argument is argument whether in the
box or at the bar, and its proper place is the last. The testimony of
an expert upon such issues, especially his cross-examination, greatly
extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot be better
heard after the evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be allowed
at all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal, it cumbers
the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is led into
the intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand
upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered impressions
upon its own perusal. We hope that in this class of cases such
evidence may in the future be entirely excluded, and the case

23. For a general overview, see generally Paul W. Orth, The Use of Expert Witnesses in
Musical Infringement Cases, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 232 (1955).
24. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) [hereinafter Nichols
I], aff’d, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) [hereinafter Nichols II].
25. See MOSES MALEVINSKY, THE SCIENCE OF PLAYWRITING (1925); see generally MARK
ROSE, AUTHORS IN COURT: SCENES FROM THE THEATER OF COPYRIGHT 98–103 (2016)
(discussing Malevinsky’s unusual trial strategy, which included himself testifying for seven
days).
26. See Nichols I, 34 F.2d at 147.
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confined to the actual issues; that is, whether the defendant copied
it, so far as the supposed infringement is identical.27

The modern formulation of copyright infringement analysis emerged
sixteen years later in the Second Circuit. Ira Arnstein, a litigious and prolific
but largely unknown composer, alleged that five of famed composer Cole
Porter’s popular compositions infringed multiple Arnstein compositions.28
Porter denied ever hearing Arnstein’s composition. The case unfolded shortly
after the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which played
a significant role in the formulation of the modern infringement framework.
Arnstein set forth a two-part test focused on what became known as “illicit”
copying. As formulated then, the plaintiff had to prove “(a) that defendant
copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted work and (b) that the copying (assuming it
to be proved) went to [sic] far as to constitute improper appropriation.”29 The
first prong allowed expert testimony. “On this issue, analysis (‘dissection’) is
relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of the
facts.”30 The second prong required proof of “illicit copying (unlawful
appropriation).”31 Judge Jerome Frank declared that “the test is the response
of the ordinary lay hearer; accordingly, on that issue, ‘dissection’ and expert
testimony are irrelevant.”32 Judge Frank’s reasons for the categorical rejection
of expert testimony on this second question remain perplexing and appear to
have been motivated more by the unique interpersonal interaction between the
judges on the panel than any rational belief in the value of experts.33
Nevertheless, it found its way into the majority’s opinion.
The Arnstein court, however, did not altogether preclude the use of expert
testimony during the actual comparison of the two works, even where it was
the jury who determines the issue. To the contrary, the court emphasized that
expert testimony (there from trained musicians) could instead aid the factfinder in assessing the responses of the intended audience (music listeners) for
the work.34 The court explicitly determined that use of expert testimony may

27. Nichols II, 45 F.2d at 123.
28. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946); see generally GARY A. ROSEN,
UNFAIR TO GENIUS: THE STRANGE AND LITIGIOUS CAREER OF IRA B. ARNSTEIN (2012).
29. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement
Analysis, 68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 832–37 (2016).
34. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (“[Expert testimony of musicians] may aid the jury in
reaching its conclusion as to the responses of [lay listeners].”).
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be appropriate in aiding the fact-finder even under the second prong.35 Yet, it
forewarned that such expertise not become “controlling” on the question, but
instead an aid to the decision-maker.36
The Arnstein framework was developed against the backdrop of a deep
skepticism towards courts’ reliance on summary judgment to decide the
question of infringement. In the many years since the decision, much has
changed on that front.37 Not only has the standard for summary judgment as
articulated in Arnstein been significantly overhauled, but courts’ very resort to
summary judgment is now actively encouraged in the jurisprudence.38 Despite
this reality, courts around the country continue to rely on Judge Frank’s twostep formulation.
The modern reliance on summary judgment to decide infringement has
further complicated the two-part test formulated in Arnstein, which was
designed for use principally in trials. With courts in most jurisdictions able to
decide both steps of the test on a motion for summary judgement,39 the
prohibition on expert testimony to aid the second step is often rendered
functionally moot. Since they make use of such testimony on the first step, the
prohibition on using it for the second merely translates into courts avoiding a
complete (or “determinative”) reliance on such testimony in their decision on
the second prong. Nevertheless, to the extent that infringement cases proceed
to trial—either bench or jury—the prohibition on expert testimony on the
second prong remains widespread. And here the unfortunate reality remains
that even though Arnstein did not altogether preclude expert testimony on the
second prong but merely prohibited treating it as determinative, the Ninth
Circuit, as we shall see, has treated the rule as a firm prohibition.
III.

COMPUTER SOFTWARE CASES: AN EXCEPTION TO
THE TRADITIONAL RULE LIMITING EXPERT
TESTIMONY

As the computer software marketplace emerged in the early 1970s,
Congress included computer software within the scope of “literary works” in

See id.
See id.
See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 852–53.
Id.
See ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
COPYRIGHT LAW § 3 (2018).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

IN
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the Copyright Act of 1976.40 In view of the technological complexity of
computer software—entailing unusual and technical computer languages that
are unfamiliar to lay judges and juries41—courts came to see that expert
testimony would be necessary to perceive the similarity of computer programs.
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,42 the Third Circuit
recognized that the Arnstein limitation on the use of expert witnesses in the
subjective stage of the infringement analysis did not make sense in computer
software cases:
The ordinary observer test, which was developed in cases involving
novels, plays, and paintings, and which does not permit expert
testimony, is of doubtful value in cases involving computer
programs on account of the programs’ complexity and unfamiliarity
to most members of the public. See Note, Copyright Infringement of
Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68
MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285–88 (1984). Cf. Note, Copyright Infringement
Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial
Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1981) (criticizing lay observer
standard when objects in question are intended for particular,
identifiable audiences). Moreover, the distinction between the two
parts of the Arnstein test may be of doubtful value when the finder
of fact is the same person for each step: that person has been
exposed to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is supposed
to ignore or “forget” that evidence in analyzing the problem under
the second step. Especially in complex cases, we doubt that the
“forgetting” can be effective when the expert testimony is essential

40. The Act includes “literary works” within the class of “works of authorship.” See 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The House Report explains:
The term ‘literary works’ does not connote any criterion of literary merit or
qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual,
reference, or instructional works and compilations of data. It also includes
computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original ideas, as
distinguished from the ideas themselves.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) (emphasis added). Other provisions of the 1976 Act,
however, maintained traditional exclusions for ideas and functional features, 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b), and Congress added additional safeguards against overbroad protection in 1980, Act
of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117)
(adopting recommendations of the NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1979)). See Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An
Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 315–18 (2018).
41. See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1051–57 (1989).
42. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab’y, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
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to even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in
question.
On account of these problems with the standard, we believe that the
ordinary observer test is not useful and is potentially misleading
when the subjects of the copyright are particularly complex, such as
computer programs. We therefore join the growing number of
courts which do not apply the ordinary observer test in copyright
cases involving exceptionally difficult materials, like computer
programs, but instead adopt a single substantial similarity inquiry
according to which both lay and expert testimony would be
admissible. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485,
1493 (D. Minn. 1985); Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management
Assistance Inc., 2 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) para. 25,529 (D. Idaho
Feb. 3, 1983) (enunciating bifurcated test, but relying entirely on
expert testimony); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752–
53 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (relying entirely on expert testimony to find
substantial similarity); see also Fed. R. Evid. 701 (“If [expert
testimony] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness . . . may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.”).43

In the landmark Altai case, the Second Circuit distinguished Arnstein and
held that the prohibition on expert testimony was inapplicable to comparisons
of computer software under the second prong because “we cannot disregard
the highly complicated and technical subject matter at the heart of these
claims.”44 The court observed that “computer programs are likely to be
somewhat impenetrable by lay observers—whether they be judges or juries—
and, thus, seem to fall outside the category of works contemplated by those
who engineered the Arnstein test.”45 Consequently, the Altai court concluded
that “on substantial similarity with respect to computer programs, we believe
that the trier of fact need not be limited by the strictures of its own lay
perspective,” and it was at “the discretion of the district court to decide to
what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of
computer programs, is warranted in a given case.”46 The Altai decision
expressly permits expert testimony at the discretion of the district court.47

43. Id. at 1232–33 (citations omitted). While we agree with the Whelan court’s
determination that software experts ought to be permitted to aid judges and juries in perceiving
the works at issue in computer software cases, we question the manner in which the Whelan
court applied copyright’s limiting doctrines. See Menell, supra note 41, at 1074.
44. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
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Other courts followed the Second Circuit’s lead. The Tenth Circuit has
“[i]n substantial part . . . adopt[ed]” the Altai test in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
Chemical Industries, Ltd.48 Although Gates Rubber did not explicitly address expert
testimony at all stages of the test, Altai allows such testimony, and the Gates
Rubber court endorsed use of experts in at least some of the inquiry.49 The Fifth
Circuit has also adopted the Altai test, although it did not explicitly address the
use of experts to aid comparison.50
Three other circuits have approved the use of expert testimony to evaluate
substantial similarity in cases involving difficult or complex works other than
software. The Fourth Circuit in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc. firmly rejected the
approach of refusing to permit expert testimony in a music case, noting that
“only a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a court to embrace
a doctrine that requires a copyright case to turn on the opinion of someone
who is ignorant of the relevant differences and similarities between two
works.”51 The court replaced the “ordinary observer” with the “intended
audience” of the work and permitted the fact-finder to rely on expert
testimony.52 The Dawson court noted that “the advent of computer
programming infringement actions” forced the trend towards allowing expert
testimony for complex subject matter.53
The Sixth Circuit addressed the use of experts in a case alleging copyright
infringement of technical patent drawings.54 Its two-step test contemplates use
of expert testimony; in its second step, “the trier of fact should make the
substantial similarity determination from the perspective of the intended
audience. Expert testimony will usually be necessary to educate the trier of fact in those
elements for which the specialist will look.”55
Although the First Circuit uses a traditional “ordinary observer” test, it
recognized in a case involving architectural works that “the need for expert
testimony may be greater in cases involving complex subject matters where an ordinary
48. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993).
49. See id. at 834–35 (“[I]n most cases we foresee that the use of experts will provide substantial
guidance to the court in applying an abstractions test.”) (emphasis added).
50. See Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342 (5th Cir.
1994), opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995).
51. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 736 (“When conducting the second prong of the substantial similarity inquiry,
a district court must consider the nature of the intended audience of the plaintiff’s work. . . .
Such an inquiry may include, and no doubt in many cases will require, admission of testimony
from members of the intended audience or, possibly, from those who possess expertise with
reference to the tastes and perceptions of the intended audience.”).
53. Id. at 735.
54. See Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003).
55. Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
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observer may find it difficult to properly evaluate the similarity of two works
without the aid of expert testimony.”56 The D.C. Circuit has noted the trend
of allowing expert testimony for comparison of complex works like software,
though without explicitly addressing the issue.57
IV.

THE UNWITTING ORIGIN OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
“NUTTY” RULE: KROFFT TELEVISION PRODUCTIONS,
INC. V. MCDONALD’S CORP.

Even though Arnstein was decided under a now-overruled standard for
summary judgment,58 it remains influential. And unfortunately, so does the
misunderstanding of its views on the use of expert testimony. Nowhere is this
more prominent than in the Ninth Circuit, which purported to develop its own
two-part test based on Arnstein.
In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit was called upon to develop an approach to the
infringement analysis that recognized copyrightable works as embodying both
protected and unprotected elements.59 In recognizing therefore that
protectability was a seemingly objective enterprise that entailed analyzing
components of a work against a set of objective principles—such as originality,
the idea-expression dichotomy, scènes-à-faire, and the like—the court adopted
a two-part formulation:
The test for infringement therefore has been given a new dimension.
There must be ownership of the copyright and access to the
copyrighted work. But there also must be substantial similarity not
only of the general ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as well.
56. T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 116 (1st Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added). It then explicitly “le[ft] to the district court the determination of whether
this may be a case in which expert testimony would be helpful on the issue of substantial
similarity.” Id. (reversing the district court’s decision in part for rejecting expert testimony on
substantial similarity). Although T-Peg endorses a rule that allows use of experts in some
circumstances, at least one later First Circuit opinion indicates that the issue is not fully settled.
See Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L-3 Commc’ns Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 106 n.7 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Where,
as here, the copyrighted work involves specialized subject matter such as a computer program,
some courts have held that the ‘ordinary observer’ is a member of the work’s ‘intended
audience’ who possesses ‘specialized expertise.’ . . . This court has yet to directly address this
issue, and it is unnecessary to do so here.”) (citing Dawson, Kohus, Altai, and Whelan).
57. See Sturdza v. U.A.E., 281 F.3d 1287, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that “[a]
growing number of courts now permit expert testimony regarding substantial similarity in
cases involving computer programs, reasoning that such testimony is needed due to the
complexity and unfamiliarity of computer programs to most members of the public” and
remanding for further development) (internal quotations omitted).
58. See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 852–55.
59. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977).
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Thus two steps in the analytic process are implied by the
requirement of substantial similarity. . . .
We shall call [the test for the similarity of ideas] the ‘extrinsic
test.’ It is extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of
the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and
analyzed. Such criteria include the type of artwork involved, the
materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject.
Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert
testimony are appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be
decided as a matter of law. . . .
The test to be applied in determining whether there is substantial
similarity in expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one —
depending on the response of the ordinary reasonable
person. . . .
This same type of bifurcated test was announced in Arnstein. . . .
We believe that the court in Arnstein was alluding to the ideaexpression dichotomy which we make explicit today.60

In developing its own two-part formulation, Krofft fundamentally
misunderstood the analytical basis and rationale behind the Arnstein test and
its rules about expert testimony. Appreciating this misunderstanding requires
delving a little bit deeper into the Arnstein test and the analytical basis of its
rules.
To begin with the basics, the first step in the Arnstein formulation—the
question of factual copying—is an entirely evidentiary question. Indeed, it is
for this reason that some have referred to this step as the question of
“probative similarity,” to the extent that it relies on a comparison of the two
works in order to infer such copying.61 Yet, the question is not whether the
defendant simply copied from the plaintiff’s work. Instead, it is whether the
defendant copied protectable expression from the plaintiff’s work. And this is
because, as a corollary of the fundamental precept of copyright law that not all
copying is infringement,62 all works contain both protectable and
unprotectable elements. Indeed, this part of the test is meant to weed out the
possibility that the plaintiff and defendant both drew from a common source,
the public domain, or indeed altogether unprotected materials, such as ideas
or unoriginal expression. It is for this reason that Arnstein’s reference to expert
60. Id. at 1164.
61. See, e.g., Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some
Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1194–95 (1990).
62. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“Not all
copying, however, is copyright infringement.”).
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testimony here is in conjunction with its mention of analytic “dissection,” a
reference to the process of breaking down the work into its constituent parts
in order to analyze the origin and protectability of different components.63 As
should be apparent, the expert is meant to aid the court in determining just
this breakdown—i.e., how much of the plaintiff’s work is itself unprotected
since it draws on prior sources or materials that are in the public domain.
Expert testimony, in other words, aids on the question of protectability that is
implicit—yet crucial—in the first step of Arnstein. Built into the infringement
analysis is thus an implicit emphasis on protectability.
At least as framed by the court, Krofft’s first step—extrinsic copying—has
little to do with actual copying by the defendant. All the same, even in the
Ninth Circuit, and by Krofft’s own admission,64 such actual copying is needed.
This then reveals that in Krofft there is in reality a step zero, which covers a part
of Arnstein’s first step. The Ninth Circuit refers to this as the question of
“access” rather than factual copying,65 but it is a crucial preliminary to any
further analysis. Access is meant to allow courts to infer actual copying and
then proceed to the question of substantial similarity, which Krofft breaks down
into two further steps. By framing its step zero as being about access, the Ninth
Circuit effectively eliminates the issue of copying from this step and, instead,
merely focuses on whether the defendant had reasonable access to the
plaintiff’s work, regardless of what the defendant actually did with such access.
To the extent that the Krofft test must give effect to the idea that works embody
uncopyrightable elements, the extrinsic test becomes crucial.
Bringing the Krofft framework on parallel with the Arnstein test on the first
step would thus imply having the extrinsic test expressly address the issue of
protectability, before proceeding to a side-by-side comparison of the two
works. Yet, the extrinsic test—as formulated in Krofft—does just the opposite.
In focusing on the similarity of “ideas” and other potentially unprotectable
elements (such as the “type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject
matter, and the setting for the subject”), Krofft sidesteps focusing on
protectability.66 Later panels of the Ninth Circuit have noted this absurdity and
attempted to re-focus the extrinsic test on protectability by characterizing it as
being about “objective manifestations of creativity” focused on “the
measurable, objective elements that constitute . . . expression,”67 as well as by
63. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
64. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163 (“The real task in a copyright infringement action, then,
is to determine whether there has been copying of the expression of an idea rather than just
the idea itself.”).
65. Id. at 1172.
66. See id. at 1164.
67. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1990).
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noting that “only those elements of a work that are protectable and used
without the author’s permission can be compared . . . .”68 All the same, even
in this reformulation the focus does not appear to be primarily on
protectability. It instead emphasizes the objective breakdown of the work in
order to enable a court to determine whether the similarity is sufficient to allow
for a subjective comparison.
The second step in Arnstein focuses on wrongful copying and asks the factfinder, i.e., ordinarily the jury, to determine whether the defendant’s copying
of protected expression from the plaintiff’s work was sufficient in both
qualitative and quantitative terms so as to amount to an infringement. Hence
the test uses the phrase “wrongful” or “illicit” copying. The comparison is
meant to be subjective in that the fact-finder is meant to rely on his or her
perception (or equivalent sensorial facility) and intuition for the determination.
With perceived similarity being the crucial touchstone of this step, the
framework attempts to limit (though not prohibit) expert testimony, which
could obviously influence such perception. A professional musician’s ability to
distinguish two musical compositions will thus obviously be different from a
lay person’s comparison of them, and the test strongly prefers the latter.69 Yet
it is crucial to recognize that the reason why this framework can be
comfortable in relying on such subjectivity without worrying about the factfinder’s misunderstanding about the protected elements of the work is because
the prior step focused entirely on protectability. In other words, the Arnstein
framework quite neatly parses out protectability and perceivable similarity in its two
steps, even if it presents other problems.
Krofft’s second step replicates the subjective assessment contained in the
Arnstein second step. It thus focuses on the perception of the works by lay factfinders. And while it endorses Arnstein’s idea of keeping expert testimony out
of this analysis by noting that “expert testimony [is] not appropriate,”70 it pays
little attention to the fact that the extrinsic test may not have sufficiently
addressed the question of protectability. The extrinsic test’s focus on
“objective” elements may at times overlap with copyright’s criteria for
protection, but it need not have to. Finding a similarity in plot lines or
characters in two works is of little use if those common elements are
themselves drawn from another source. This inevitably means that the notion
68. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994).
69. Judge Frank vividly made this point in Arnstein v. Porter. See 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d
Cir. 1946) (“The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to
the musical excellence of plaintiff’s or defendant’s works are utterly immaterial on the issue of
misappropriation; for the views of such persons are caviar to the general—and plaintiff’s and
defendant’s compositions are not caviar.”).
70. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
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of protectability—central to copyright—cannot be eliminated altogether from
the intrinsic test. And for this, expert testimony is essential and cannot be
foregone.
The Krofft test’s conflation of protectability and perceivability remained
largely manageable in practice when the dispute involved non-technical subject
matter that lay audiences routinely encountered—literary works, artistic works,
musical works, and the like. When it came to technical subject matter such as
computer software, the problem became exacerbated. Here, like with literary
works in a foreign language, lay juries are incapable of making analytical sense
of the expression itself. Without being able to understand and contextualize
the expression, they became forced to invariably conflate protectability and
similarity. Juries had to shoot in the dark in making side-by-side comparisons
of subject matter of which they had little understanding and were unlikely to
have ever encountered before.
Altai recognized this problem—inherent in both the Arnstein and Krofft
tests, but more trenchant in the latter—and modified the prohibition on expert
testimony during comparisons of computer software. Since the Ninth Circuit
never expressly endorsed (or applied) this modification in Altai, the circuit
continues to adhere to the original formulation tracing back to Krofft and
without any consideration of its implications for technical subject matter.71
Therein emerged the nuttiness of the Ninth Circuit’s rule.
V.

ANTONICK V. ELECTRONIC ARTS: MANIFESTATION OF
THE “NUTTY” RULE72

Several cases in the Ninth Circuit suggested that wooden application of the
Krofft rule limiting the use of experts would not make much sense in software
cases,73 but it was not until Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc.74 that the Ninth Circuit
71. In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., Judge Sneed noted in a concurring opinion
that the Ninth Circuit precedent “provides a poor analytic structure by which to determine the
substantial similarity of an allegedly infringing computer program,” preferring the Third
Circuit’s “integrated substantial similarity test pursuant to which both lay and expert testimony
would be admissible.” 960 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992) (Sneed, J., concurring).
72. This Part draws on Appellant’s Brief, Antonick, 841 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2016) (No.
14-15298), 2014 WL 3909266 [hereinafter Antonick 9th Circuit Opening Brief], and
Complaint, Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. C 11–1543 CRB, 2014 WL 245018 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Antonick Complaint].
73. See id.; Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (suggesting that “an integrated test involving expert testimony and analytic
dissection may well be the wave of the future in [computer software cases]” but noting that
the Ninth Circuit’s position “is clearly marked out in Krofft, and controls the analysis here”).
74. Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., 841 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2016).
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directly confronted the admissibility of expert witness testimony in computer
software cases. The backstory to this litigation is important to understanding
the Ninth Circuit’s surprising decisions to bar expert testimony that would
enable lay jurors to compare the works at issue.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MADDEN FOOTBALL VIDEO GAME

The Antonick case grew out of the development of Madden Football, the
iconic video game that launched the sports video game industry.75 As an
industry observer aptly noted in 2013, the 25th anniversary of the game,
From its humble beginnings on an Apple II computer in 1988 to the
modern marvels now featured on PS3 and Xbox 360 (and soon to
further amaze on the next generation consoles), Madden’s evolution
largely mirrors the evolution of video games in general. Few
franchises—really, only Mario and Zelda—have had the cultural
staying power and impact of Madden.76

Prior to Madden Football, video games were relatively primitive in their
simulation of sport activities. In the early 1980s, the state of the art for video
football games featured only three or five players per side due to the limitations
of early microcomputers. The early games did not hold users’ attention for
long because the players ran predetermined routes and the outcomes were
determined by static rules. In 1983, Robin Antonick, a former college football
player and skilled computer programmer, conceived of a far more authentic
football video game that could simulate 11-on-11 player action and
sophisticated dynamic models of player behavior. He showed a prototype to
William “Trip” Hawkins, founder and Chief Executive Officer of Electronic
Arts (EA), then a fledging video game publisher.77 Hawkins was impressed.
Soon thereafter EA hired Antonick as an independent contractor to develop a
commercial version of the game. The EA-Antonick contract provided
Antonick with royalties on versions of the game that Antonick developed as
well as games derived from his versions.
After that deal was signed and Antonick had begun work on the
commercial version of the video game, Hawkins persuaded John Madden,
former coach of the Oakland Raiders and a popular NFL broadcaster, to lend
his name to the game. Antonick and Hawkins translated Madden’s playbook
75. See John Gaudiosi, Madden: The $4 billion video game franchise, CNN (Sept. 5, 2013, 11:51
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/technology/innovation/madden-25/.
76. Timothy Rapp, Madden 25: Rounding Up Reviews of Iconic Game, BLEACHER REP. (Aug.
27, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1751592-madden-25-rounding-up-reviews
-of-iconic-game.
77. Trip Hawkins, a former Apple employee, founded Electronic Arts in 1982. See
generally Electronic Arts, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Arts.
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and play calling into computer algorithms and integrated them into the
computer program.
In December 1986, EA and Antonick revised the agreement, pursuant to
which Antonick would develop the newly titled “John Madden Football”
videogame for the Apple II, Commodore 64, and IBM platforms.78 In addition
to receiving compensation for those “Works,”79 Antonick would be entitled to
royalties on all “Derivative Works,” defined as:
any computer software program or electronic game which either (a)
constitutes a derivative work of the Work within the meaning of the
United States copyright law or (b) produces audiovisual effects
which infringe the copyright in the audiovisual effects produced by
the Work. Derivative Works include, for example, significant
enhancements of the Work to add additional features or improve
performance and adaptations of the Work to operate on computers
or operating systems other than those described in the
Specifications.80

EA also promised to (1) protect against unauthorized use of Antonick’s
intellectual property, including his Development Aids,81 and (2) offer Antonick
a right of first refusal to develop Derivative Works.
Over the next two years, Antonick developed the computer source code
for the original John Madden Football video game, which was implemented
on the Apple II computer (“Apple II Madden”). Antonick’s game took the
sports video game genre from primitive abstract games with few players and
simple actions to sophisticated simulation of multi-faceted, 11-on-11 football
action integrating player data, complex strategies, and user manipulation of
player controls.
In February 1987, Antonick and EA executed Amendment I to the 1986
Contract. Among other things, Antonick agreed to a higher royalty rate on
sales of Works and “Derivative Works by Artist” and, depending on the
microprocessor used, a lower or higher royalty rate on “Derivative Works by
Publisher.” Antonick was to receive a royalty for any Derivative Work in the
same “Microprocessor Family” as the Apple II’s microprocessor. Amendment
I limited Antonick’s right of first refusal to Derivative Works developed for
certain Microprocessor Families, but also provided that if Antonick developed
78. See ELEC. ARTS, INC., SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLISHING AGREEMENT
§ 4 [hereinafter 1986 Contract].
79. Id. at § 5.
80. Id. at Exhibit A § 1.03 (defining “Derivative Work”).
81. “Development Aids” included “equipment, firmware, and software utilities . . . used
or developed by [Antonick] which might be useful . . . in developing any Derivative Work.”
Id. at Exhibit A § 5.05.
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a Derivative Work for a “new” Microprocessor Family, his right of first refusal
would be revived with respect to that family. Finally, EA promised “not to use
or otherwise provide” Antonick’s Development Aids to employees or third
parties in preparing Derivative Works on different microprocessor families.
As a means of simulating actual National Football League games, Antonick
integrated the physics of player and ball movement with a player ratings model
based on multiple attributes. Drawing on his football knowledge, Antonick
combined the player ratings structure with an elaborate system of hundreds of
offensive and defensive plays. After EA signed John Madden to collaborate
and lend his name to the game, Antonick adapted and refined the existing plays
and play-calling to incorporate Madden’s ideas.
Around that time, Richard Hilleman, an EA employee, joined the project
as the Apple II Madden producer. Antonick spoke with Hilleman regularly,
discussing, among other things, the execution of game features and solutions
to implementation issues.
Pursuant to the agreements, Antonick was required to deliver detailed
documentation of his code and other intellectual property, including (1)
“complete assembled source code with sufficient comments to allow the easy
understanding of each routine, subroutine and table by an individual
conversant with 6502 assembly language”; (2) “an overall program description,
including the file name of each module of code,” “a narrative of the flow of
control,” “a complete list of subroutines with a short description of each,” and
“an explanation of key data structures”; and (3) a description of “any firmware
or software utilities used.”82
In 1988, EA released Apple II Madden. According to EA, the game was
an “overnight success” that “exceeded its high expectations” and “went on to
sell more copies than any other sports game of its time.”83 On the heels of this
acclaim, Antonick programmed Madden games for the Commodore 64 and
IBM-compatible computer platforms. In 1989, he began work on Madden
games for the Nintendo and Sega Genesis entertainment systems. In October
1989, Antonick and EA entered into Amendment VIII to the 1986 Contract,
requiring Antonick to develop a “script” and a technical design review for Sega
Genesis and Nintendo versions and providing that Antonick would receive
“additional compensation” in the form of 3% royalties on sales of any
“Nintendo Derivative Work” or “Sega Genesis Derivative Work.” As

82. See Antonick 9th Circuit Opening Brief, supra note 72, at 9–10.
83. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Electronic Arts’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment at
5, Antonick v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01543-CRB (Document 224) [hereinafter
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Second MSJ].
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producer on the Nintendo version, Hilleman reviewed Antonick’s design
script and discussed Antonick’s ideas for console games.
In an abrupt shift of course, Hilleman told Antonick in August 1990 that
EA had decided not to publish Derivative Works for Nintendo or Sega
Genesis.84 Instead, Hilleman said that EA was going in a different direction
with a Sega Genesis game with “more of an arcade style.” Hilleman said that
EA had already hired another company, Park Place Productions, to develop
the new Sega game “independently” of Antonick’s work. Because there would
be a separation between Antonick’s work and the development of the Sega
game, Antonick would have no royalty or other rights in the Sega game.
Hilleman also told Antonick that the “Nintendo marketplace had started to
disintegrate” and to stop working on Nintendo Madden.
Just three months later—barely in time for the holiday shopping season—
EA released its first version of Sega Madden.85 EA continued to issue Madden
games for Sega Genesis, Super Nintendo, and other platforms annually since
1992. After Antonick completed the second IBM game in 1992, his work with
EA was substantially over, and he moved on to other projects. EA’s Madden
Football franchise would go on to remarkable sustained success, racking up
billions of dollars in revenue.86
B.

ANTONICK’S DISCOVERY THAT EA BASED SEGA MADDEN ON APPLE
II MADDEN

In conjunction with its celebration of Madden Football’s twentieth
anniversary in 2009, EA released publicity materials describing the game’s
history. To Antonick’s surprise, the materials traced the Sega Madden to
Antonick’s Apple II Madden version. Antonick viewed a CNBC interview of
Trip Hawkins, who also connected the design and coding of the later editions
of the Madden Football video game software franchise back to Apple II
Madden. Antonick looked further into the matter and discovered on the
website of Park Place co-founder Troy Lyndon that he credited EA’s Hilleman
with helping to develop 1990 Sega Madden, noting that Hilleman spent
“countless hours” with Park Place programmer Jim Simmons to make the
game more realistic. Antonick then realized that, contrary to Hilleman’s
assurances in 1990, Sega Madden had not been developed independently of
84. Id. at 7–9.
85. See Transcript of Proceedings at 478, Antonick, No. 3:11-CV-01543-CRB [hereinafter
Trial Transcript].
86. By 2013, EA had sold more than 100 million copies of Madden NFL, generating
more than four billion dollars in total sales. Madden NFL, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madden_NFL (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
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Apple II Madden.87 Hilleman, who had worked on Apple II Madden and had
intimate knowledge of its design and code, apparently played a direct and
critical role in developing Sega Madden.
Antonick alleged that until these revelations, he had no reason to question
EA’s account of how Sega Madden was developed. The Sega Genesis gaming
platform had a more powerful microprocessor than the Apple II resulting in a
more realistic visual simulation. Therefore, the Madden Sega screen displays
differed substantially from the Madden Apple II visual appearance.88 Yet the
underlying code could well have been derived from Madden Apple II.
Antonick did not have access to the Sega Madden source code and therefore
could not have assessed the extent to which Park Place based Sega Madden on
Apple II Madden’s software code and design.
As a result of the 2009 information, Antonick became suspicious that Park
Place had not, as EA informed him, developed Sega Madden independently.
EA had assured Antonick that it would safeguard his source code and design
documents, and would ensure that the development of any subsequent works
that were outside of the “derivative works” definition would only be produced
using a “clean room” process.89 Growing out of a seminal copyright case
involving Sega,90 the software industry came to follow a “clean room” process
for independently developing interoperable software,91 but the 2009
87. In a November 2009 interview, Lyndon stated that “Hilleman came down to our
office and liver there for well over a month with Simmons turning something that looked good
into something that actually played great football.” Antonick Complaint, supra note 72, at ¶ 77.
88. The parties stipulated that “[p]laying or viewing a John Madden Football video game
for the Sega Genesis or Super Nintendo would not have allowed the person looking at the
screen or playing the game to determine how a particular game element was expressed in
source code.” Trial Transcript, supra note 85, at 466.
89. Antonick Complaint, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 59–65.
90. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
reverse engineering of copyrighted software to discover its unprotected features constitutes
fair use).
91. The “clean room” process was formalized during the first wave of software copyright
litigation as a means of developing interoperable software and ensuring that proprietary
materials do not infect software development. The clean room process typically involves three
teams of engineers and legal specialists. The first team—referred to as the “specification” or
“dirty room” team—works with the target software to determine the functional specifications.
A second “coordination” or “audit” team, comprised of attorneys and engineers, establishes
clear ground rules for managing the clean room process, screens programmers for the “clean
room” team so as to ensure they have never seen the copyright-protected code, documents
the activities and communication of the “dirty room” and “clean room” teams, oversees the
process, and advises on what constitutes functional specifications and how to determine code
segments that are unprotectable—segments that are unoriginal, standard programming
practices, and necessary for interoperability or to accomplish specific processes or methods.
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revelations appeared to contradict EA’s assurances that Sega Madden was not
derived from Antonick’s work product.92 EA was entitled to pursue such
derivative works, but was required pursuant to its contracts with Antonick to
pay him an ongoing royalty.
C.

ANTONICK’S COMPLAINT AND THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
ISSUE

In March 2011, Antonick filed suit against EA alleging breach of contract
and fraud.93 The complaint implicated copyright law through the clause of the
Antonick-EA contact that entitled Antonick to royalties if subsequent versions
of Madden Football “constitute[] a derivative work of [Apple II Madden]
within the meaning of the United States copyright law.”94 The contract defined
“Derivative Works” to include, for example, “significant enhancements of the
Work to add additional features or improve performance and adaptations of
the Work to operate on computers or operating systems other than those
described in the Specifications.”95 Hence, the Antonick contract cause of
action turned on whether Sega Madden was derived, the copyright sense, from
Apple II Madden.
The Copyright Act defines a “derivative work” as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
The coordination team seeks to ensure that no copyright-protected expression or
misappropriated trade secrets get communicated to the clean room team. It is only after those
checks are completed that the process of independently coding an interoperable program
commences. The functional specifications detailing the particular processes or results that the
target program accomplishes is then passed to the “clean room” team of programmers. This
team remains shielded from the copyright-protected code. It designs, writes, and tests code
aimed at accomplishing the target functional specifications. See Jorge Contreras, Laura Handley
& Terrence Yang, NEC v. Intel: Breaking New Ground in the Law of Copyright, 3 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 209 (1990); G. Gervaise Davis III, Scope of Protection of Computer-Based Works: Reverse
Engineering, Clean Rooms and Decompilation, 370 COMPUT. L. INST. 115 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Practice Course Handbook Series No. G-370, 1993);
Menell, supra note 39, at 448–49; P. Anthony Sammi, Christopher A. Lisy & Andrew Gish,
Good Clean Fun: Using Clean Room Procedures in Intellectual Property Litigation, 25 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 3 (2013).
92. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Second MSJ, supra note 83, at 9–12.
93. See Antonick Complaint, supra note 72; John Gaudiosi, Madden Creator Sues Electronic
Arts for Millions in Royalties, FORBES (Apr. 1, 2011, 5:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/johngaudiosi/2011/04/01/madden-creator-sues-electronic-arts-for-millions-in-royalties
/#cbfdcba4d32a.
94. Antonick Complaint, supra note 72, at 7.
95. Id.
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be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which,
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative
work.”96

Courts base the determination of whether a subsequent work constitutes a
derivative work on whether it violates the right to reproduce, i.e., whether it is
an infringement of the copyrighted work.97 Therefore, the key legal issue was
whether Sega Madden infringed Apple II Madden.
D.

PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: IMPROPER WHITTLING OF THE
PLAINTIFF’S BASIS FOR SHOWING THAT EA DERIVED SEGA
MADDEN FROM APPLE II MADDEN

The case was ultimately assigned to Judge Charles Breyer of the Northern
District of California. EA sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
Antonick waited too long to file suit. Judge Breyer denied EA’s motion to
dismiss and ordered the case to be tried in three phases: (1) EA’s statute of
limitations defense; (2) EA’s liability with respect to Madden games released
before 1996; and (3) EA’s liability with respect to non-Madden games98 and
post-1996 Madden games.99 Phases (1) and (2) were to be done seriatim with
the same jury. Phase 3, if necessary, would follow at a later time.100
In view of the technical and legal complexity of the case, the parties
engaged in extensive discovery disputes and motion practice. Remarkably, EA
failed to locate complete copies of the source code for Apple II Madden and
early versions of Sega Madden. Nonetheless, Antonick had retained source
code for versions of the games that he designed and other documentation,
including a sixty-page game manual detailing the Apple II Madden design. He
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “derivative work”).
97. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a work
is derivative “only if it would be considered an infringing work if the material which it has derived
from a prior work had been taken without the consent of the copyright proprietor of such
prior work” (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1976))); MELVILLE NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09[A][1] (2019) (suggesting
that right to prepare derivative works is superfluous in that “[u]nless enough of the pre-existing
work is contained in the later work to constitute the latter an infringement of the former, the
latter, by definition, is not a derivative work”).
98. Antonick alleged that other EA sports games, such as NCAA Football and NHL
Hockey, also constituted derivative works of Apple II Madden for which royalties should have
been paid. See Antonick Complaint, supra note 72, at 23.
99. See Antonick v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting the trial
phases).
100. See id.; Antonick 9th Circuit Opening Brief, supra note 72, at 16; Eriq Garner,
Electronic Arts Faces Jury Trial over ‘Madden NFL’, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 26, 2013, 10:42 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/electronic-arts-faces-jury-trial-447243.
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retained Michael Barr, an experienced computer engineering expert.101 Barr
prepared a detailed report analyzing Antonick’s source code files, source code
and EA’s technical files containing source code for eight distinct versions of
Madden football games for Sega Genesis and Super Nintendo, as well as
various documents, declarations, discovery responses, and depositions.102
Antonick alleged that Simmons, Park Place’s lead programmer, was
woefully behind schedule producing Sega Madden and called in EA’s
Hilleman, who was intimately familiar with Antonick’s design and code, in
order to meet the tight production deadline. Antonick also alleged that
although Sega Madden was written in a different assembly code language for
the Sega Genesis console (which used the Motorola 68000 microprocessor as
opposed to the Apple II’s MOS Technology 6502 microprocessor),103
Simmons and his team followed the Apple II Madden design down to the nonstandard field dimensions,104 player directional tracking system,105 particular
play routes, naming (including misspellings) and ordering of plays, player rating
model, decision points, data flow architecture, and game engine design (e.g.,
representation of ball carrier positioning and player pursuit, use of randomness
in conjunction with player ability to introduce variable uncertainty). Barr’s
analysis showed that Sega Madden’s compilation of features, as well as subfeature design, choice, and particular code elements, were substantially similar
to Apple II Madden.
In response, EA sought to whittle down Antonick’s basis for proving that
Sega Madden was a derivative work through summary judgment motions,
motions in limine, and jury instructions. Drawing on inapt lines of cases limiting
the scope of copyright protection for general functional features of computer

101. See Michael Barr, Expert Resume, Antonick, v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01543CRB (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014), 2012 WL 7160593.
102. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); Report of Michael Barr at Exhibit B, Antonick, No.
3:11-cv-01543-CRB [hereinafter “Barr Report”] (explaining “[t]he source code for a pair of
programs written in different assembly languages will look very different to the casual
observer—even if they do the very same things—just as a pair of contracts for the same
purpose but written in German and Spanish will appear visually different”) (under seal).
103. See Barr Report, supra note 102, at 18, 27–29.
104. Whereas the NFL uses a field width of 53.33 yards, Antonick used an 80-yard width.
This feature carries over to many aspects of the coding and representation of the video game
as the game players, unlike actual NFL players, will move more quickly up and down the field
than they will laterally.
105. Barr opined that the use of the same directional tracking system made it easier for
Park Place to emulate many other aspects of Antonick’s game design, subroutines, and coding.
See Barr Report, supra note 102, at 51.
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software,106 EA persuaded Judge Breyer to restrict the basis for asserting
similarity to two of the ten elements that Antonick sought to use in showing
that Sega Madden constituted a derivative work of Apple II Madden: (1) nonstandard field width and (2) plays and formations.107 Thus, the court severely
impeded Antonick’s core compilation theory, but the granular design and
coding decisions relating to plays and formations left some room for pursuing
the derivative work case. Further stacking the deck in EA’s favor, Judge Breyer
drew on another line of inapt cases108 to require that Antonick prove not
merely that Sega Madden was substantially similar to Apple II Madden, but
that it was virtually identical.109
These rulings fundamentally misconstrued applicable copyright principles.
Copyright law protects original compilations of even individually
unprotectable elements.110 Although all of the individual words in a language
are unprotectable, copyright law robustly protects the compilation that
106. See Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005)
(involving an independently developed video golf game); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a microcomputer graphical user interface using
a desktop metaphor, much of which was licensed to the defendant); Data East USA, Inc. v.
Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving an independently developed video karate
game); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (involving the
declarations necessary for interoperability). We explain further below why these cases are
inapt. See infra text accompanying notes 115–118.
107. See Jury Instructions at 5–6, Antonick, No. 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (Document 509)
[hereinafter Jury Instructions]; Phase Two Pretrial Order, Antonick, No. 3:11-cv-01543-CRB
(Document 460), 2013 WL 9774980; Memorandum and Order re Defendant’s Third Motion
for Summary Judgment, Antonick, No. 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014)
[hereinafter Third MSJ Order] (sealed).
108. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010); Incredible Techs.,
400 F.3d 1007; Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003); Apple Comput., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc.,
889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989); Data East USA, 862 F.2d 204. We explain below why these cases
are inapt. See infra text accompanying notes 123–125.
109. See Jury Instructions, supra note 107, at 6 (instructing the jury that Antonick “must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that considering Sega Madden as a whole—that is,
considering both the protected and unprotected elements—an ordinary reasonable observer
would find Sega Madden virtually identical to Apple II Madden” (emphasis added)); Third MSJ
Order, supra note 107.
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (protecting compilations); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a
“compilation” as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or
of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship”). See generally MELVILLE NIMMER, 1 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04[B] (2019) (discussing the legal standard for protection of compilations);
Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding an
original compilation of otherwise uncopyrightable components to be protected); Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the format of baseball form containing
pitching statistics copyrightable).
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comprises a novel. Similarly, although copyright law does not protect
individual colors, copyright generally subsists in paintings comprising an
original compilation of colors. In the computer software context, even though
individual 1’s and 0’s of object code and general processes and algorithms are
not copyrightable, original compilations of specific coding and design choices
are generally protectable, unless there is only one or a few ways of
accomplishing the functional task.111 The robustness of copyright protection
for computer programs—their thickness or thinness—depends, as in other
copyrightable works, on the range of expressive choice.112 The design and
coding of a very intricate video game, such as Apple II Madden, attracts
significant copyright protection as a compilation of protectable and
unprotectable elements, even though particular names, plays, directional
tracking designs, and decision points are individually unprotectable. And even
though the rules of football cannot be monopolized through copyright
protection, the compilation of particular ways that they are implemented in a
sophisticated software product can be copyrightable.
Even after the first football video game is published, others are free to
independently develop their own football video games, but they are not free
to copy highly particularized design and coding choices of the first comer
without authorization. Nor can they develop sequels or more advanced
versions that draw significantly upon on the granular design and coding
elements of the original work.113 Second comers usually lack access to the
source code, which is typically not publicly released. Video game publishers
typically protect their source code as trade secrets. They distribute their games

111. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT
18-21 (1979). Courts have treated this report as legislative history to the 1980 amendments to
the 1976 Act. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260–61 (5th Cir. 1988);
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983).
112. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J.
203, 221–26 (2012) (discussing thickness as a variable in copyright infringement analysis).
113. The language in the EA-Antonick contract arguably went further than copyright
law’s derivative work right in stating that “derivative works” “include, for example, significant
enhancements of the Work to add additional features or improve performance and adaptations
of the Work to operate on computers or operating systems other than those described in the
Specifications.” See 1986 Contract, supra note 78. Based on the contract’s preceding sentence
stating that “derivative works” for which royalties were due “constitute[] a derivative work of
[Apple II Madden] within the meaning of the United States copyright law,” Judge Breyer
accorded no weight to the express enhancement example in the contract. Id. This
interpretation was questionable as the scope of the derivative work right under the 1976 Act
was somewhat ambiguous at the time that the contract was drafted, and the enhancement
example provides a concrete indication of the parties’ intent.
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in object code format from which it is very difficult to decipher the source
code.114
EA drew Judge Breyer off-course by focusing on software cases that
fundamentally differed from the alleged copying that occurred in the Antonick
case. In Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc.,115 and Incredible Technologies, Inc. v.
Virtual Technologies, Inc.,116 the plaintiff sought to monopolize karate and golf
video games, respectively, by seeking to block independently developed video
games based on the general rules of these sports as well as general hardware
and software constraints. In Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., Oracle seeks to
protect arguably unprotectable declarations necessary for computer system
interoperability.117 And in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Apple sought
to block Microsoft and others to whom it licensed many elements of its
graphical user interface from implementing the desktop metaphor for
organizing microcomputer screen layout and functionality.118
While all of these cases are important to understanding the general
contours of copyright protection for computer software, they differ
fundamentally from the issues raised in Antonick v. Electronic Arts. In Data East
and Incredible Technologies, the defendants independently developed their software
from scratch; they had no access to the source code or particular design
architecture of the plaintiff’s software. Furthermore, unlike Antonick v.
Electronic Arts, those cases related to audiovisual elements, not the underlying
code. The games appeared similar to the plaintiffs’ works because they
followed the rules and context of the sport (soccer or golf) and general
software and video game principles. In Oracle v. Google, Google independently
implemented the source code using only the declarations necessary for
interoperability.119 And in Apple v. Microsoft, a prior licensing agreement
114. Trade secret protection, however, is not absolute. Trade secret law does not bar
reverse engineering. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1329, 1351–53 (1987). Competitors can at times (but often at great cost) reverse
engineer the functional specifications of computer programs. They can use those functional
specifications to produce interoperable or otherwise competing products without violating
copyright law. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Donald S.
Chisum, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Paul Goldstein, Robert A. Gorman, Dennis S. Karjala,
Edmund W. Kitch, Peter S. Menell, Leo J. Raskind, Jerome H. Reichman & Pamela
Samuelson, LaST Frontier Conference on Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS
J. 15, 23–25, 32 (1989).
115. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
116. Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Tech., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005).
117. See Menell, supra note 40, at 376–89.
118. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 35 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
119. See Menell, supra note 40, at 366–67.
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afforded the defendants use of many of the elements of Apple’s graphical user
interface. Furthermore, the desktop metaphor for a user interface was both
obvious and developed originally by Xerox for its Star workstation.120 Apple’s
design team based the Apple Lisa and Apple Macintosh on the Xerox Star
design and Smalltalk, an object-oriented programming language also
developed at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC).121 Moreover, Apple
hired Larry Tesler, one of the developers of the Xerox Star, to join the Apple
development team.122 None of these cases involved an insider with access to
source code.
By contrast, the central issue in Antonick v. Electronic Arts was whether EA
and Park Place used Antonick’s detailed program design, documentation, and
source code in developing Sega Madden. Simmons allegedly had unfettered
access to Antonick’s design documents and code, and he received guidance
and supervision from Hilleman and other EA employees intimately familiar
with Antonick’s granular programming choices. Under impossibly tight timeto-market pressure, EA and Park Place’s inexperienced programmer took
shortcuts—copying protectable design and coding elements—to complete in
three months what Antonick’s experienced team had taken four years to
accomplish.
EA also drew Judge Breyer off-course on the standard for similarity by
focusing on cases involving simple, narrowly protected elements, none of
which involved the sophisticated, granular, integrated design and coding
choices involved in the Madden football video games. Harper House, Inc. v.
Thomas Nelson, Inc.,123 involved the largely standardized visual layout of a day
planner (comprising a calendar and ruled lines). Data East and Incredible
Technologies solely involved the conventional audiovisual elements for karate and golf
videogames. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. involved largely unoriginal
(and licensed) graphical office icons. Satava v. Lowry,124 involved a jellyfish
sculpture encased in a domed glass cylinder. And Mattel, Inc. v. MGA
120. See Xerox Star, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xerox_Star (last visited
Aug. 30, 2020).
121. Members of the Apple Lisa engineering team saw Star at its introduction at the 1981
National Computer Conference and converted their desktop manager to an icon-based
interface modeled on the Star. Chris Morgan, An Interview with Wayne Rosing, Bruce Daniels, and
Larry Tesler, 2 BYTE 90, 108 (1983); Smalltalk, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Smalltalk (last visited Aug. 30, 2020)
122. John Markoff, Lawrence Tesler, who Made Personal Computing Easier, Dies at 74, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/technology/lawrence-tesler
-dead.html; see also Larry Tesler, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Tesler (last
visited Aug. 30, 2020).
123. Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989).
124. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Entertainment, Inc.,125 involved a “sculpt” for human-based dolls with enlarged
facial features and feet. None of these cases involved anywhere near the
complexity and range of choice reflected in the Apple II Madden video game.
Consequently, the court should not have elevated the standard for
similarity. While the court was correct in filtering out unprotectable elements
as separate bases for infringement, it erred in effectively blocking the core of
Antonick’s compilation infringement allegation. The full Barr Report provided
just that type of analysis. He examined both the Apple II Madden compilation
forest and the particularized trees.126 Judge Breyer’s severe whittling of the case
excluded not only most of the trees but also the forest.
Copyright law does not work that way. Novelists can enjoin those who
reproduce their compilation of unprotectable words and artists can enjoin
those who reproduce their compilation of unprotectable colors. By treating
Antonick v. Electronic Arts like cases in which software developers independently
produce competing sports video games without access to the underlying code,
visual artists take only the idea and not the particularized expression for an
artistic work (e.g., a jelly fish encased in a glass dome or a doll with pronounced
facial features and feet), and a mobile phone developer uses unprotectable
code necessary for interoperable sub-systems and implements the operating
system in a clean room, Judge Breyer improperly ripped the heart out of the
plaintiff’s case.
E.

JURY TRIAL: VERDICTS FOR ANTONICK

The statute of limitations trial commenced on June 17, 2013.127 EA
contended that Antonick waited too long to file his lawsuit. Antonick
countered that he only became aware of the alleged breach of contract as a
result of Hawkins’ revelations during the Madden Football 20th anniversary
celebration. After several days of proceedings, the jury unanimously found that
Antonick did not discover or know of facts that would have caused a
reasonable person to suspect that EA had breached its 1986 contract with
Antonick before November, 21, 2005, and therefore the statute of limitations
did not bar the case.128
After a two-week hiatus to prepare for the liability phase, the parties
presented their opening arguments on July 9, 2013, to the same jury. Both
125. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010).
126. See generally Barr Report, supra note 102.
127. See Beth Winegarner, EA Can’t Sink ‘Madden’ Royalties Suit in Jury Trial, LAW360 (June
21, 2013, 7:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/452353.
128. See Special Form of Verdict, Antonick v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. C 11-1543 CRB (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 22, 2014) (Document 441), 2013 WL 12183203.
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parties (and Judge Breyer) recognized that software experts would be needed
for the jury to understand computer programming and software code. During
her opening statement, EA’s lead counsel displayed some source code from
Sega Madden and forthrightly acknowledged that “[t]here are people who can
read it. I cannot.”129
Antonick constructed his argument that Sega Madden was derived from
Apple II Madden on circumstantial and direct forms of evidence.130 Antonick
contended that the only way that Park Place could have produced the fully
functional, highly sophisticated Sega Madden football video in just a few
months was by translating Antonick’s binary play data131 into source code for
the Sega Genesis 68000 microprocessor. Antonick emphasized the painstaking
effort required to produce well-functioning, bug-free code for a sophisticated
football video game,132 and Antonick reinforced his derivative work contention
by showing Simmons’ lack of prior experience playing football or
programming football video games133 and EA’s failure to provide any credible
explanation for how Simmons obtained or developed the critical play data.134
129. Trial Transcript, supra note 85, at 649 ll. 5–6.
130. The court instructed the jury that “[e]vidence may be direct or circumstantial. You
should consider both kinds of evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight to
be given to direct or circumstantial evidence. It is for you to decide how much weight to give
to any evidence.” Id. at 2053 ll. 2–6.
131. Judge Breyer ultimately instructed the jury that “the term source code includes binary
files.” Id. at 2055 ll. 19–20.
132. See id. at 675–79 (Michael Kawahara), 741–57 (Robin Antonick). Kawahara testified
that a particular defensive play took over a week to create, test, and tune. See id. at 677 l. 25,
678 l. 1. Antonick testified that it would take “days and possibly more than a week” to test a
single play against all 81 defensive plays, id. at 749 l. 25, 750 l. 1, and “we had to log hundreds
of hours of testing per play to be able to get to the point where we felt confident that that play
was executing up to the norms that we had—that standard that we had set for the ultimate
NFL simulation,” id. at 753 ll. 10–13.
133. See id. at 1643 ll. 17–25 (Jim Simmons). EA sought to work with Park Place on Sega
Madden because it had produced the successful “Monday Night Football” video arcade game
(MNF). Id. at 1245 ll. 2–12 (Richard Hilleman). EA thought that Scott Orr, the lead
programmer for MNF, would be leading the Sega Madden team. See id. at 976 ll. 21–23 (Scott
Orr) (testifying that he designed MNF in 1989), 2064 ll. 11–21 (referring to Exhibit 133, a
Park Place planning document for SEGA Football noting Scott Orr was to provide play data).
Orr, however, only wrote the high-level script for Sega Madden and declined to code the game.
See id. at 1591 l. 10, 1661 l. 7–1662 l. 6 (Jim Simmons). EA’s Hilleman complained about Park
Place’s shift in staffing for Sega Madden as a “bait and switch.” Id. at 1157 l. 17. Antonick
contended that Simmons lacked the football and video football coding experience to handle
the responsibilities assigned to him and that he was chosen principally because he was a high
school buddy of Troy Linden, Park Place’s CEO. See id. at 1584 ll. 4–6 (Jim Simmons).
134. According to assistant producer Michael Brook, Sega Madden had “[n]o plays,
nothing. No play calling.” as late as July 1990 for a game that was published in November
1990. Id. at 1557 l. 20.
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Antonick suggested that EA employees with access to Antonick’s code—likely
Michael Brook, EA’s Associate Producer for Sega Madden, and Richard
Hilleman—provided Simmons with the critical source code (and play data)
needed for Park Place to get Sega Madden to function properly.135 EA
conceded that it had access to Antonick’s source code.136
Antonick offered evidence that EA rushed Sega Madden to market as part
of plan to sabotage Sega’s efforts to gain a strong position in the emerging
video football marketplace. This entailed showing that Trip Hawkins duped
Sega into thinking that EA’s development of Sega’s Joe Montana video
football game—a competing game on the Sega Genesis platform—would use
innovations planned for Sega Madden.137
Antonick called upon Michael Barr, its principal software expert, to explain
the design and coding of the two video games.138 Barr generally explained how
embedded systems, like the Apple II and the Sega Genesis, function.139 He also
generally discussed programming languages, coding of embedded systems,
compilers, and the distinction between source code and executable code that
computer systems can process.140
Barr then explained the files that he had been provided for analyzing the
source code in the case141 and how he went about deciphering the code bases
and design elements to gain insight into the extent to which the field width,
plays, and formations in Sega Madden were derived from Apple II Madden.
He used demonstrative examples from his expert report to illustrate the
similarities that the different code languages and data structures would
otherwise obscure. This in part involved explaining hexadecimal (base-16)
representation of numerical information.142 Through his deciphering of code,
Barr was able to show numerous examples of code and play data that were
similar or identical in Apple II Madden and Sega Madden. These examples
were then illustrated to the jury using demonstrative exhibits.
Figure 1 (demonstrative Exhibit 485) illustrated how the internal
numbering of offensive plays in 1990 Sega Madden matched the numbering,
selection, and arrangement of plays in Apple II Madden.143 The 1990 edition
of Sega Madden had fewer plays than Apple II Madden, but it drew almost
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id. at 1557–58 (Michael Brook), 1659 ll. 8–16, 1664–67 (Jim Simmons).
See id. at 2062 ll. 8–12.
See id. at 1715–19, 1748–50 (Trip Hawkins).
See id. at 1295–1325, 1342–1456, 1475–90.
See id. at 1299–1303.
See id. at 1303–05.
See id. at 1305–12.
See id. at 1322–23.
See id. at 1362–71.
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entirely from the eighty-one offensive plays in Apple II Madden and used a
nearly identical internal numbering system.
Figure 1: Comparison of Football Play Names and Order in Apple Madden and Sega Madden

Barr next explained how it was possible to compare the player formations
and movements across the two games. Figure 2 (demonstrative Exhibit 645)
depicts the data from the Apple II Madden assembly language program.144 The
semicolons indicated comments. Thus, the first row indicates that this is the
“Nickel,” or five defensive back formation. The second row indicates the
eleven player designations (0 followed by 1-10 to equal 11). The third row
indicates the X coordinate position in the two-dimensional field grid. The
fourth row indicates the Y coordinate position. The locations in the grid are
represented in hexadecimal (dollar sign followed by a two element
representation with the size indicated by 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, C, D,
E, and F).
144. See id.
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Figure 2: Illustrative Apple II Madden Assembly Code Data

;
;
FX42
FY43
FP42

NICKEL
0
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DB $8D, $75, $99, $69, $99, $69 $5D, $39, $D5, $81,
DB $7F, $7F, $7F, $7F, $7C, $7C, $73 $79 $79 $70
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10
$B1 ;X COORDINATE
$76 ;Y COORDINATE
17 ;POSITION

Figure 3 (demonstrative Exhibit 646) is the data that the Apple II Madden
play editor generated.145 It provides the data for simulating the play called NIC
reddog, which indicates a defensive rush or blitz,146 from the Nickel defensive
formation.
Figure 3: Apple II Madden Play Editor Data

Figure 4 (demonstrative Exhibit 647) depicts source code from 1990 Sega
Madden for a formation and play.147 Barr explained that the play data is in
binary code.

145. See id. at 1373–75.
146. See
Blitz
(gridiron
football),
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Blitz_(gridiron_football) (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (explaining the origin of the term “reddog” in football).
147. See Trial Transcript, supra note 85, at 1375–77.
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Figure 4: Illustrative 1990 Sega Madden Formation and Play Source Code

As a way of enabling the jury to visually compare the plays and formations
of the two games, Barr developed software to read in the data from both games
and generate side-by-side depictions of formations and player movements in
relationship to the line of scrimmage.148 Figure 5 (first page of demonstrative
Exhibit 476) shows that comparison. The left side depicts offensive plays 16,
19, 41, 48, and 58 from Apple II Madden. The right side depicts offensive
plays 16, 19, 41, 48, and 58 from Sega Madden. The other plays represented in
demonstrative Exhibit 476 showed similar patterns.
148. See id. at 1377–82.
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Figure 5: Comparison of Offensive Plays—Apple II Madden and Sega Madden
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Barr also testified to the presence of various misspellings and distinctive
character strings from the source code for Apple II Madden that show up in
Sega Madden source code.149
Regarding later versions of Sega Madden, Barr testified that the plays in
1990 Sega, derived from Apple II Madden, were also found in subsequent Sega
versions.150 Barr illustrated this point by walking through an example of a play
from 1995 Sega Madden, demonstrating how plays persisted from Apple II
Madden to 1995 Sega Madden.151 Barr also testified that he found no evidence
that subsequent versions of Sega Madden ever eliminated plays used in both
Apple II Madden and 1990 Sega Madden.152 He further noted that additional
plays from Apple II Madden were added to later Sega versions.153
EA’s defense centered on the theme that Park Place independently
developed Sega Madden and the only reason for the similarity of the plays and
formations was that Simmons used a selection of plays from playbooks that
Judge Breyer ruled unprotectable. EA’s lead counsel used the following
analogy to illustrate the point:
Let’s suppose two people have decided to do a painting of the
Golden Gate Bridge. Their paintings likely would look similar. And
if you look at these two paintings they look similar. There are
differences, but they don’t look similar . . . because one copied the
other’s painting. They look similar because they are both painting
the same thing, the Golden Gate bridge.
In the same way, Jim Simmons and Robin Antonick used the plays
that Trip Hawkins wrote and implemented them into their game by
writing source code. Jim Simmons had as much right as Robin
Antonick to use the plays in the Apple II playbook, just as one
painter has as much right as another to paint the Golden Gate
bridge.154

In his closing argument, Antonick’s lead counsel contended that the only
plausible explanation for Park Place’s rapid successful implementation of Sega
Madden, its avoidance of inevitable software bugs, the nearly identical play
formations and player movement, the selection and arrangement of plays and
play names, and the telltale misspellings and other similarities with Apple II

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 1384–93.
See id. at 1397–98.
See id. at 1398–99.
See id. at 1397–98.
See id. at 1399–1401.
See id. at 656 ll. 13–25.
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Madden source code was that Simmons received and emulated Antonick’s
code, play data, and other granular details of Apple II Madden.155
EA responded by reminding the jury of its Golden Gate bridge painting
analogy to contend that Simmons independently developed Sega Madden.156
She emphasized that “[e]very single EA witness who testified told you they did
not see Mr. Antonick’s source code in connection with the making of the Sega
Madden game or any other game.”157 She admonished the jury that “[i]n order
to find in favor of Mr. Antonick, you would have to find that each and every
one of these witnesses came in here, swore to tell the jury under penalty of
perjury, and deliberately lied to you.”158
Antonick’s counsel responded by paraphrasing an insight commonly
attributed to C.S. Lewis—“[i]ntegrity is what you do when no one is
looking”159—as the key to solving the puzzle.160
The jury unanimously found for Antonick on the plays and formations
element, finding that there were substantial similarities in the source code for
Apple II Madden and Sega Madden, and that Antonick had proven that all
seven editions of Sega Madden under consideration (from 1990 to 1996),
considered as a whole, were virtually identical to Apple II Madden.161 The jury’s
verdict set the stage for a third phase focused on EA games released after 1996.
Before undertaking that process, the court turned its attention to post-trial
motions.
F.

POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: JUDGMENT FOR EA AS A MATTER OF
LAW

EA filed a motion pursuant to Rule 50 to overturn both of the jury’s
verdicts—statute of limitations and breach of contract—as a matter of law.162
155. See id. at 2057–85.
156. See id. at 2107–08.
157. See id. at 2087 ll. 8–10.
158. See id. at 2087 ll. 13–16.
159. C.S. Lewis Found., Quotes Misattributed to C.S. Lewis, LIVING THE LEGACY OF C.S.
LEWIS, http://www.cslewis.org/aboutus/faq/quotes-misattributed/ (last visited Aug. 30,
2020).
160. See Trial Transcript, supra note 85, at 2129 ll. 19–20.
161. See Special Verdict Form, Antonick, No. CV 11-01543 CRB (Document 516), 2013
WL 9768250; Beth Winegarner, EA Owes ‘Madden NFL’ Coder $3.6M in Royalties, Jury Finds,
LAW360 (July 23, 2013, 8:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/459582.
162. See EA’s Amended Renewed Phase II Motion for Judgment as A Matter of Law
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(B), or, Alternatively, Motion for New Trial Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59,
Antonick, No. 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (Document 540); Electronic Arts Inc.’s Notice of Motion
and Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law that Antonick’s Claims Are Barred by the Statute
of Limitations, Antonick, No. 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (Document 443); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
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Under Ninth Circuit law, “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when
the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
permits only one reasonable conclusion, which is contrary to the jury’s
verdict.”163 The court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only
if “ ‘there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the nonmoving] party on that issue.’ ”164 If, however, “there is ‘such relevant evidence
as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support the jury’s
conclusion,’ ” the motion should be denied.165 When considering a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court may not make credibility determinations,
weigh the evidence, or substitute its own view of the evidence for the jury’s.166
Notwithstanding the high threshold for overturning a jury verdict, Judge
Breyer granted EA’s motion with respect to the jury’s breach of contract
determination.167 The court drew heavily on its pretrial ruling that Apple II
Madden was only entitled to thin protection, and hence Sega Madden would
only constitute a derivative work “if an ordinary reasonable observer
comparing Apple II Madden as a whole to Sega Madden as a whole would
consider the works virtually identical.”168 While acknowledging that Antonick
identified a broad range of similarities, Judge Breyer concluded that “Antonick
does not point to any evidence of the works ‘as a whole.’ ”169 The court noted
that “Barr’s opinion that all seven Sega Madden games are ‘essentially the same’
as a whole cannot substitute for the jury’s subjective comparison of each of
the seven Sega Madden games as a whole to Apple II Madden as a whole.”170
The court based this conclusory statement on the limitation on expert
opinion first announced in Krofft:
Because the intrinsic test requires the perspective of an ordinary,
reasonable observer, Funky Films, Inc. [v. Time Warner Entertainment
Co., L.P.], 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 [(9th Cir. 2006)], expert testimony is
not admissible evidence of similarity for purposes of the intrinsic
163. Hagen v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Omega Envtl.,
Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1997)).
164. Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000)).
165. Hagen, 736 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856
(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th
Cir. 1987))).
166. See EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150).
167. See Antonick, No. C 11–1543 CRB, 2014 WL 245018 (order granting EA’s Amended
Renewed Phase II Motion).
168. Id. at *6 (citing Third MSJ Order in n.6).
169. Id. at *7.
170. Id. at *9.
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test. See, e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448–49
(9th Cir.1988) (stating that expert testimony is appropriate under the
extrinsic test, but not under the intrinsic test); Express, LLC v. Fetish
Grp., Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1228 (C.D. Cal.2006) (“While expert
testimony is generally appropriate in conducting the extrinsic test,
expert testimony may not be considered in conducting the intrinsic
test.”) (internal citation omitted); Trust Co. Bank v. Putman Publ’g Grp.,
Inc., No. CV 87 07393 AHS(JRX), 1988 WL 62755, at *6 (C.D.Cal.
Jan. 4, 1988) (“Expert testimony is inadmissible on this intrinsic
test.”). See also Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
713 (2d Cir.1992) (“[E]xpert testimony may be used to assist the fact
finder in ascertaining whether the defendant had copied any part of
the plaintiff’s work. . . . However, once some amount of copying has
been established, it remains solely for the trier of fact to determine
whether the copying was ‘illicit’. . . . Since the test for illicit copying
is based upon the response of ordinary lay observers, expert
testimony is thus ‘irrelevant’ and not permitted.”) (citations
omitted).171

Funky Films, Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., and Trust Co. Bank v.
Putman Publishing Group, Inc. rely on Krofft’s questionable standard.172 These
decisions don’t address whether experts should be permitted to translate
technical computer design and coding into a form that a jury can comprehend
for the purposes of comparing works written in different computer languages.
It is particularly unnerving to see the court’s reliance on footnote 10 in
Altai, which expressly permitted the use of expert witnesses in software
copyright cases for the very purpose of enabling lay judges and juries to
surmount the task of making the illicit copying determination.173 Had Judge
Breyer continued reading the Altai decision following the excerpt he quoted in
footnote 10, he would have seen that the Second Circuit carefully explained
why it was departing from traditional expert witness rule for computer software
cases. The Second Circuit explains:
Historically, Arnstein’s ordinary observer standard had its roots in
“an attempt to apply the ‘reasonable person’ doctrine as found in
other areas of the law to copyright.” 3 NIMMER § 13.03[E][2], at 13–
62.10–11. That approach may well have served its purpose when the
material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily
comprehensible and generally familiar to the average lay person.
171. Id. at *9, *9 n.9.
172. See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076–77 (9th
Cir. 2006) (citing Krofft); Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448–49 (9th Cir.
1988) (citing Krofft); Trust Co. Bank v. Putman Publ’g Grp., Inc., No. CV 87 07393 AHS(JRX),
1988 WL 62755, at *5–*6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1988).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 44–47.
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However, in considering the extension of the rule to the present
case, we are reminded of Holmes’ admonition that, “[t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.” O.W. Holmes, Jr.,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
Thus, in deciding the limits to which expert opinion may be
employed in ascertaining the substantial similarity of computer
programs, we cannot disregard the highly complicated and technical
subject matter at the heart of these claims. Rather, we recognize the
reality that computer programs are likely to be somewhat
impenetrable by lay observers—whether they be judges or juries—
and, thus, seem to fall outside the category of works contemplated
by those who engineered the Arnstein test. Cf. Dawson v. Hinshaw
Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir.) (“departure from the lay
characterization is warranted only where the intended audience
possesses ‘specialized expertise’ ”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
As Judge Pratt correctly observed:
In the context of computer programs, many of the familiar
tests of similarity prove to be inadequate, for they were
developed historically in the context of artistic and literary,
rather than utilitarian, works.
Computer Assocs., 775 F.Supp. at 558.
In making its finding on substantial similarity with respect to
computer programs, we believe that the trier of fact need not be
limited by the strictures of its own lay perspective. See Dawson, 905
F.2d at 735; Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233; Broderbund, 648 F.Supp. at
1136 (stating in dictum: “an integrated test involving expert
testimony and analytic dissection may well be the wave of the future
in this area. . . .”); Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1478–79 (Sneed,
J., concurring); see also 3 NIMMER § 13.03[E][4]; but see Brown Bag
Software, 960 F.2d at 1475 (applying the “ordinary reasonable person”
standard in substantial similarity test for computer programs).
Rather, we leave it to the discretion of the district court to decide to
what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding the highly technical
nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given case.
In so holding, we do not intend to disturb the traditional role of lay
observers in judging substantial similarity in copyright cases that
involve the aesthetic arts, such as music, visual works or literature.
In this case, [MIT Computer Science Professor] Dr. Davis’ opinion
was instrumental in dismantling the intricacies of computer science
so that the court could formulate and apply an appropriate rule of
law. While Dr. Davis’ report and testimony undoubtedly shed
valuable light on the subject matter of the litigation, Judge Pratt
remained, in the final analysis, the trier of fact. The district court’s
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use of the expert’s assistance, in the context of this case, was entirely
appropriate.174

Similarly, in the Antonick trial, Barr’s testimony and demonstrative exhibits
were “instrumental in dismantling the intricacies of computer science so that
the court could formulate and apply an appropriate rule of law.”175 Since Altai
was a bench trial, Judge Pratt stood in the jury’s shoes.
To make matters worse, faithful application of Rule 50(b) dictates
affirmance of the jury’s liability determination. Judge Breyer should have
credited the jury’s assessment of both circumstantial and direct evidence, just
as he instructed.176 In conjunction with the extensive circumstantial evidence
that Simmons used Antonick’s code to complete Sega Madden, Barr’s
testimony enabled the jury to understand the binary play data and many other
technical aspects of video game programming necessary for lay jurors to
evaluate the questions before it. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Antonick, including credibility determinations, should have led
Judge Breyer to reject EA’s Phase II Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL)
motion and uphold the jury’s verdict. The jury was fully entitled to conclude,
as Antonick argued, that Simmons faithfully emulated the Apple II Madden
play data in writing Sega Madden source code and that subsequent editions of
Sega Madden reproduced the derived code.177 Thus, it is difficult to see how
Judge Breyer did not usurp the jury’s role.
G.

NINTH CIRCUIT APPEAL: RECOGNITION, AFFIRMANCE, AND
EXPANSION OF THE “NUTTY” RULE

While it was astounding to see the district court so badly misinterpret
copyright jurisprudence in its pretrial rulings, misapply the Rule 50(b) standard
in its post-trial ruling, and misread Altai in overturning the jury’s verdict, surely
the Ninth Circuit would correct these errors. It seemed inconceivable that the
Ninth Circuit would not distinguish software code cases from cases involving
works that are readily perceptible to lay fact-finders as regards the admissibility
of expert testimony, as all of the circuits to consider the issue had,178 or, at a
174. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted).
175. Id. at 714.
176. See supra note 130.
177. It is also worthwhile noting that the definition “derivate works” in the EA-Antonick
contract expressly included “significant enhancements of the Work to add additional features
or improve performance and adaptations of the Work to operate on computers or operating
systems other than those described in the Specifications.” 1986 Contract, supra note 78, at
Exhibit A § 1.03 (defining “Derivative Work”).
178. See supra Part III.
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minimum, call for en banc reconsideration of Krofft, at least with regard to
computer software copyright cases, as Judge Sneed had intimated.179
Antonick’s opening appellate brief squarely presented the errors,180
including the argument that EA waived its Rule 50(b) argument regarding
insufficiency of the evidence of virtual identity of the works as a whole by
failing to preserve the issue.181 EA’s opposition echoed the “thin” copyright
arguments that it used to mislead the district court in its pretrial rulings—
namely that competitors are free to independently develop competing video
games—even though this case involved alleged sequels developed with full
access to the underlying source code and design documents.182 The jury ruled
that Simmons did not independently develop Sega Madden based on ample
evidence.
EA also argued that Antonick’s complaint must fail because “[a] copyright
plaintiff cannot establish that one work infringes another without proving the
content of the two works so that they can be compared.”183 Although EA failed
to produce the final source for Apple II Madden, Antonick located and
produced original drafts of source code, data files, and design documents for
Apple II Madden that enabled Michael Barr to provide the jury with
comparisons of the Apple II Madden and Sega Madden design and code bases
that laypeople could understand. Barr explained similarities in, among other
things, selection and expression of plays and formations, ordering and
numbering of plays, player ratings, nonstandard and disproportionate field
width, names of plays and variables, and misspellings that were unlikely to
occur absent copying of Antonick’s code by Park Place.184 EA also sought to
revive its statute of limitations defense, which the jury rejected in the phase I
trial185 and Judge Breyer upheld in his post-trial ruling.186

179. See supra note 71.
180. See Appellant’s Brief, Antonick v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2016) (No.
14-15298), 2014 WL 3909266.
181. See Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
party may not seek a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on grounds not alleged in their
motion for directed verdict).
182. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 180, at 60–68.
183. Id. at 29.
184. See Trial Transcript, supra note 85, at 1295–1325, 1342–1456, 1475–90.
185. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 180, at 80–89.
186. See Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., No. C 11–1543 CRB, 2014 WL 245018, at *3–
*6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014).
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At oral argument on March 16, 2016,187 Judges Andrew Kleinfeld, Johnnie
Rawlinson, and Andrew Hurwitz launched into the statute of limitations
defense. Drawing on his experience programming computers decades
earlier,188 Judge Kleinfeld suggested—contrary to the stipulation at trial, the
significant differences between the Apple II and Sega Genesis platforms, and
the testimony of software experts from both sides—that “it’s inconceivable
that a game developer would not notice that his game had been copied until
many years later when there was an anniversary special. You would think that
he’d been playing football games.”189 Judge Kleinfeld then opined:
[W]hen you have written a computer program, you can usually tell
something about the technique of how it was created even though
you can’t tell the details just as if you know some other craft,
traditional dark room photography, you can make a pretty good
judgment about how a particular effect was produced. Now you
can’t do it for sure until you have disassembled the code, but if you
have a big economic interest, one would think that you would.190

The parties’ stipulation191 and trial record contradicted Judge Kleinfeld’s
assertion.192
Shortly thereafter, Judge Kleinfeld pursued his hunch that Antonick could
have easily disassembled the Sega Madden code to determine whether it was
copied from Apple II. Madden offered his opinion that the 68000
microprocessor used in the Sega Genesis is a descendent of the 6502
microprocessor used in the Apple II.193 As Antonick’s counsel pointed out,

187. Video Recording of Oral Argument, Antonick, 841 F.3d 1062 (No. 14-15298)
[hereinafter 9th Circuit Oral Argument], https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media
/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000009278.
188. See id. at 13:48–14:32 (showing Judge Kleinfeld explaining that he had programmed
code for the Zilog Z80 microprocessor chip and that it was easy to disassemble code for that
chip).
189. Id. at 0:59–1:16. Antonick had expressly denied playing the video football games after
he completed his work with EA. See Trial Transcript, supra note 83, at 251.
190. 9th Circuit Oral Argument, supra note 187, at 1:33–2:06.
191. See Trial Transcript, supra note 85, at 1953 (“Playing or viewing a John Madden
Football game for the Sega Genesis or Super Nintendo would not have allowed the person
looking at the screen or playing the game to determine how a particular game element was
expressed in the source code.”).
192. See id. at 1277–78 (Michael Barr), 1821–22, 1856, 1860, 1896, 1911–14 (Robert
Zeidman) (discussing the challenges of detecting copying of source code in different language).
Later in the argument, EA’s counsel contradicted Judge Kleinfeld’s assertion that disassembly
of the object code to obtain the source code could have been done. See 9th Circuit Oral
Argument, supra note 187, at 3:49–4:30.
193. See id.
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EA had not pursued that issue.194 More to the point, disassembling the video
games at issue from the object code was very difficult, as software experts for
both sides testified.195 As a result of this digression—in which a Ninth Circuit
judge who had programed some code for a more primitive microprocessor in
the early 1980s offered his own opinions about microprocessors and
disassembly—nearly half of Antonick’s oral argument time was gone.196
When the argument turned to the role of expert witnesses in software
copyright cases, Judge Hurwitz stated:
The brief from [Antonick’s] side says that in the 9th Circuit expert
testimony is allowed on the extrinsic, on the intrinsic test. I find I
don’t know eight, nine, ten cases, some involving computer code, in
our circuit saying no it’s not. Who’s right? And let me preface this
by saying that I think that’s a nutty rule if it is our rule. But my
question is: Is that our rule?197

After Antonick’s counsel responded that there was room for doubt as to the
Ninth Circuit’s rule, Judge Hurwitz responded: “You don’t have to convince
me that [the Krofft rule] is wrong in terms of policy, but you’ll have to convince
eleven judges on the court to call it en banc.”198
Since the Ninth Circuit clearly permits expert testimony of the extrinsic
aspect of the copyright infringement test, the court then delved into how the
role of experts works in practice:
Judge Hurwitz:

[The Ninth Circuit has] cases in which we have
specifically said that you cannot use expert
testimony on the intrinsic side of the test. And I
understand that we have generally said we think
that the Second Circuit is smarter than us and
does a better job. I’ll take that. My question is: Is
there any case in which we have said, and because
we’ve been so dumb in the past that we do allow
testimony on the intrinsic standard.

David Nimmer
(Antonick’s
Copyright
Appellate
Counsel):

Your Honor, I don’t have a citation to a case that
says “we have been dumb in the past,” however

194. See id. at 15:00–15:06.
195. See supra note 192.
196. Judge Kleinfeld returned to this digression later in the argument, further cutting into
Antonick’s argument time. See 9th Circuit Oral Argument, supra note 187, at 51:11–51:29.
197. Id. at 25:00–25:28.
198. Id. at 28:00–28:07.
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Judge Hurwitz:

[chuckling] Try the second part, OK [laughter]

David Nimmer:

I do have the past experience of Ninth Circuit
cases and there is no case in which the jury has
been asked unaided by expert testimony to simply
code for non-literal copying.

Judge Rawlinson:

But the expert testimony is on the extrinsic test,
isn’t it? Not the intrinsic.

David Nimmer:

Nominally it is on the extrinsic test.

Judge Kleinfeld:

Can Ninth Circuit law be read to mean that you
don’t need, and therefore cannot use, an expert to
say that the two expressions look alike, but you
may well need and can use an expert to say
whether the source code is alike?

David Nimmer:

I think that is one possibility your Honor.

Judge Rawlinson:

When you’re comparing the source code, would
that be the intrinsic test or the extrinsic test?

David Nimmer:

Well, your Honor has identified exactly the
problem, and then the dilemma in the context of
software. There has been no case in which juries
have been asked to compare different source
codes to find non-literal identity.
I think that the answer to the court’s collective
question can be as follows: How should the
intrinsic test be applied? First of all, it’s obvious
that expert testimony needs to be admitted, and
all cases in all circuits, including the Ninth Circuit,
have admitted expert testimony.
But then when the question comes to the jury,
“jury make the intrinsic test,” I could understand
not allowing the expert to give his or her ultimate
opinion—“I believe that these are, that these
express, the same idea, and that’s my personal
opinion.” The jury can be asked exactly the
question that EA poses in its own brief when it
characterizes the intrinsic test on page 33 [of its
brief]. It says in effect that the intrinsic asks
whether the defendant took from plaintiff’s work
so much of what is pleasing to the work’s
intended audience that the defendant wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the
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plaintiff, quoting Cavalier v. Random House, a case
involving children’s books.
That’s a question that after expert testimony has
been admitted, the jury can make in its
determination, in its subjective consideration as
the voice of the community. And that is not
precisely what happened here because Judge
Breyer framed the jury instruction.
Judge Hurwitz:

If we disagree with you and find that Mr. Barr’s
testimony is not admissible on the intrinsic side of
the equation, is there any other evidence that
shows, that would satisfy the intrinsic part of the
test?

David Nimmer:

OK, let’s take that step-by-step here you Honor.
Mr. Barr’s testimony, we’re going to imagine, is
admissible because it illuminates the extrinsic
test.

Judge Hurwitz:

Right.

David Nimmer:

Now the jury in its sole discretion has to apply the
intrinsic test. The jury has to determine, OK now
that we’ve heard the testimony and we’ve heard
the defense and we’ve heard the crossexamination, did EA take so much of what is
pleasing to the work’s intended audience that it
wrongfully appropriated something which
belongs to the plaintiff? That is a test the jury can
make in its subjective determination based on all
of the evidence that it has heard in the case.

Judge Hurwitz:

Even in the absence of the code being in
evidence?

David Nimmer:

Absolutely. In the presence of the code being in
evidence, nothing is added except confusion to
the jury. Let’s imagine that the code was added.

Judge Kleinfeld:

I can’t see that. I mean, even a layman can
compare what may be meaningless instruction in
the code. It would be like reading two texts that
are in a foreign language and having no idea what
the text means but being able to see that its the
same characters.

David Nimmer:

Your Honor, this court has said in the case of
Swirsky that when music is copied not identically,
we need expert testimony. And to quote the
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Swirsky Ninth Circuit opinion, “Any person
untrained in music could conclude that 2-2-2-22-1-2-1-3 did not match 2-2-4-3-2-3.” It’s the
same in this case. Any person could conclude
that the 0-0-0-1-0-0 does not match 1-0-0-1-1-0.
If that was the standard, no expert testimony
would be needed and the case would end
immediately. There would be no such thing as
non-literal copying in the Ninth Circuit if that
were the standard. Swirsky assures us that that is
not the standard. That extrinsic testimony from
an expert, a musicologist in that case, is needed.
In this case, expert testimony is needed from
someone who is expert in the field of computer
software. And that is the testimony that was
given. At the end of the day, the jury can make
its own intrinsic determination: Did the
defendant cross the line? Did the defendant
appropriate so much from the work that is
pleasing to its intended evidence that it crossed
over the line?199

During its argument, EA pressed the importance of the jury directly
comparing the works at issue.200 In response, Judge Kleinfeld remarked, “If I
were a juror, I would really want an expert, because it is too boring to go across
each line and compare. My eyes glaze over . . . .”201 Judge Hurwitz then
concluded:
[O]ur rule baffles me on this topic for the same reason that Judge
Kleinfeld just said which is that the case law seems to say that the
ordering and sequence of coding is also part of the copyrightable
protectable material and certainly having somebody say they not only
read the same number but the sequence makes some difference I
think makes some sense to me, but, you know, I don’t make the rules
here, I just follow them.202

Despite that bafflement, on November 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling that Antonick’s claim failed as a matter of
law.203 Without addressing the district court’s flawed pretrial rulings—severely
narrowing Antonick’s derivative work claim and improperly requiring “virtual
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 28:40-34:13.
See id. at 51:50–52:20, 59:16–1:00:11.
Id. at 1:01:25–1:01:33.
Id. at 1:02:40–1:03:09.
Antonick, 841 F.3d 1062.
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identity” of the works as a whole—the appellate court concluded that the
plaintiff’s failure to place the full source code of both games into evidence
made it impossible for the jury to compare the works as a whole.204
The court placed primary reliance on Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,205 which held
based on the best evidence rule206 that “[t]here can be no proof of ‘substantial
similarity’ and thus of copyright infringement unless Seiler’s works are
juxtaposed with Lucas’ and their contents compared.”207 In Seiler, the district
judge “found that Seiler had lost or destroyed the originals in bad faith under
Fed.R.Evid. 1004(1) and denied admissibility of any secondary evidence.”208
The circumstances could not have been more different in Antonick, yet the
Ninth Circuit does not make any effort to apply the clear exceptions to the
best evidence rule. Rule 1003 provides that “[a] duplicate is admissible to the
same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the
original’s authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the
duplicate.” Rule 1004 provides that
An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(a) all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent
acting in bad faith;
(b) an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process;
(c) the party against whom the original would be offered had control
of the original; was at that time put on notice, by pleadings or
otherwise, that the original would be a subject of proof at the trial or
hearing; and fails to produce it at the trial or hearing; or
(d) the writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a
controlling issue.

The defendant EA was the copyright owner and remarkably failed to locate
original copies of the Madden games, a product that earned EA billions of
dollars. Furthermore, Antonick assembled a near complete copy of the Apple
II Madden source code and design documents, and the parties were able to
provide the jury with a rich understanding of how Apple II Madden and Sega

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See id. at 1066–67.
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1987).
See FED. R. EVID. 1001–08.
Seiler, 808 F.2d at 1319.
Id. at 1317.
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Madden compared.209 As the First Circuit recognized, “if the Best Evidence
Rule is satisfied, evidence other than the original may be sufficient to establish
the content of a copyrighted work.”210
The Ninth Circuit cited other cases that focus on the insufficiency of the
evidence to prove copyright infringement.211 Yet Antonick brought a breach
of contract case which turned in part on the Copyright Act’s definition of
“derivative work.” The pertinent question was whether it was more likely than
not that EA breached its obligation to pay royalties on derivative works as
defined by the contract. Antonick provided a wealth of direct and
circumstantial evidence to prove that Sega Madden constituted a “derivative
work”—as defined by the contract—of Apple II Madden.
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of Antonick’s appeal turned on the infamous
“nutty” rule212 and two conclusory assertions. First, that the evidence
presented at trial “at most demonstrates access and a possible motive to copy”
overlooks the extensive trial record. That record, as explored above213 and to
which the court is required to view in the light most favorable to Antonick,
provided the jury ample grounds for finding that EA did not merely copy
unprotectable ideas. The jury was entitled to believe substantial evidence
showing that under impossibly tight time-to-market pressure, EA and its
inexperienced programmer took shortcuts—copying substantial amounts of
protectable design and coding elements—to complete in three months what
Antonick’s experienced team had taken four years to do. EA was caught with
209. See Barr Report, supra note 102, at Exhibit B (noting that he considered: Mr.
Antonick’s source code files, as produced on a set of floppy disks labeled as A0001, A000406, A0023-24, A0035, A0037-38, A0045-47, A0049, A0054-55, and A0058-66; Source code
and technical files recovered from floppy disks (RA0003937); twenty-two optical disks
produced by EA on which he identified source code for eight distinct versions of Madden
football games for Sega Genesis and Super Nintendo; and four floppy disks from Park Place).
210. Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L-3 Commc’s. Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 107 n.9 (1st Cir. 2011).
211. See Antonick v. Elec. Arts Inc., 841 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Airframe
Sys., Inc., 658 F.3d at 107 (“Having presented no evidence sufficient to prove the content of
its registered source code versions, Airframe cannot show that any of its registered works is
substantially similar to the allegedly infringing M3 program.”)); Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v.
Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“Without providing its own source code
for comparison, GUS did not satisfy the requirement that the infringed and infringing work
be compared side-by-side.”); Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.
1988) (granting JMOL to copyright defendant because no reasonable jury could have found
substantial similarity).
212. “[O]ur law is clear that expert testimony cannot satisfy a plaintiff’s burden of proof
under the intrinsic test, which ‘depend[s] on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.’ ”
Antonick, 841 F.3d at 1067 (footnote omitted) (citing Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,
960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977))).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 130–153.
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its hands in the protectable expression cookie jar. They did not merely take
unprotectable ideas—they raided the jar.
Second, the Ninth Circuit commented that “the lay testimony was about
how the games appeared, not how they were coded—and Antonick does not
assert a copyright interest in Apple II Madden’s audiovisual appearance, only
in its coding.” Yet the jury was presented with significant evidence about that
coding.214 The fact that a software expert presented the evidence—of play data
and other source code elements—in no way negated the fact that the jury saw
actual code. The Ninth Circuit in effect expanded the nuttiness of the “nutty”
rule. The colloquy with David Nimmer about how to interpret the “nutty” rule
sensibly was for naught.215
H.

EN BANC AND CERTIORARI PETITIONS: DENIED

The Ninth Circuit’s Antonick decision offered a glimmer of hope for
rectifying the “nutty” rule:
Antonick is not alone in contending that experts should be allowed
to help juries assess the holistic similarity of technical works such as
computer programs. See Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1478 (Sneed, J.,
concurring); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713
(2d Cir. 1992). But, given our precedents, that argument must be
addressed to an en banc court.216

Antonick decided to take a shot at rectifying the “nutty” rule.217 Although
en banc review is difficult to obtain,218 several factors weighed in Antonick’s
favor.219 The Ninth Circuit panel acknowledged that the applicability of the
Krofft rule to software code cases was controversial and in conflict with the law
in another circuit. In fact, it conflicts with the law of multiple circuits—all that
have confronted the issue.220 Moreover, the computer software industry is of
214. See supra text accompanying notes 138–153.
215. See 9th Circuit Oral Argument, supra note 187, at 29:30–34:13.
216. Antonick, 841 F.3d at 1067 n.4.
217. See Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Antonick, 841 F.3d 1062 (No 1415298) (9th Cir. 2017).
218. See Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity
“Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 861 (2020) (reporting
that the Ninth Circuit granted between 1.26% and 2.17% of en banc petitions in 2013–17).
219. See 9TH CIR. R. 35(b)(1)(B) (noting that en banc petitions must begin with a statement
that “the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each of which
must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a
question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts
with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed
the issue”).
220. See supra Part III.
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tremendous economic significance to the U.S. economy in general and states
within the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit sees a large portion of software
copyright cases.
However, the Ninth Circuit unfortunately declined the petition. All of the
panel members, despite having written that the “argument must be addressed
to an en banc court,” voted against review.221 They might have considered the
expert witness issue unnecessary for resolving the Antonick case because of the
best evidence ruling—which was also wrong,222 although perhaps not nutty.
With time running down in the fourth quarter, Antonick opted to take a
final Hail Mary223 at the U.S. Supreme Court.224 The circuit split could not have
been clearer and more significant. Alas, the Supreme Court also declined
review,225 bringing this saga to a disconcerting end.
VI.

RECTIFYING THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S NUTTY RULE

The Antonick case reads like a tragedy of errors, a Dickensian tale for the
digital age.226 Robin Antonick entered into a contract with EA to produce the
first realistic football video game, a product that would revolutionize the sports
video game industry. His contracts with EA shared the risks. Antonick was
paid modestly to produce the game with the prospect of a share of future
proceeds from his game and derivative works as defined in the contract if the
game succeeded. Antonick saw some of that return from Apple II Madden,
but he was allegedly misled into believing that the follow-on Madden games
were not derived from his design and source code. When he discovered that
he might have been defrauded, he brought suit and painstakingly gathered
extensive evidence that enabled him to get to trial. Notwithstanding flawed
pretrial rulings that severely restricted his allegations, the jury found in his
favor, only to have the district judge overturn the verdict based on
221. Order, Antonick, 841 F.3d 1062 (No. 14-15298) (“Judges Rawlinson and Hurwitz
voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Kleinfeld so recommended. The
full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote
on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. The petition for rehearing en
banc is denied.”).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 205–210.
223. This is drawn from offensive play 99 in Apple II Madden. See supra Figure 1
Comparison of Football Play Names and Order in Apple Madden and Sega Madden.
224. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Antonick v. Elec. Arts Inc., 138 S. Ct. 422 (2017)
(No. 17-168); Reply Brief for Petitioner, Antonick, 138 S. Ct. 422 (No. 17-168).
225. Antonick, 138 S. Ct. 422.
226. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 3 (1853). Sadly, Antonick is not the only
digital age BLEAK HOUSE. See Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515 (2016).
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questionable application of the Rule 50(b) standard and wooden application of
a truly “nutty” rule: that expert witnesses cannot be used to aid lay judges and
juries in deciphering and analyzing computer source code. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit panel overlooked the serious flaws in the district court’s handling
of the case, misapplied the best evidence rule, and exacerbated the nuttiness
of the “nutty” rule. The larger Ninth Circuit declined to take up the clear circuit
split, and the Supreme Court left the national law on the use of expert
witnesses in software copyright cases fragmented. Notwithstanding the
massive resources devoted to this matter, the judicial system failed to render a
coherent or just resolution.
More than four decades ago, and before Congress extended copyright law
to protect computer software,227 the Ninth Circuit ruled that expert testimony
was inadmissible to determine whether Mayor McCheese and the merry band
of McDonaldland characters infringed copyright protection for Wilhelmina W.
Witchiepoo and the other imaginative H.R. Pufnstuf costumed characters.228
While this judge-made rule made sense in dealing with works that lay judges
and jurors can directly perceive, it clearly makes no sense when applied to
hexadecimal assembly code for different processors. Although the injustice to
Robin Antonick cannot unfortunately be rectified, there remains an urgent
need to correct the “nutty” rule that derailed his case and threatens to wreak
havoc in future software copyright litigation in the Ninth Circuit.
It is perplexing that Ninth Circuit judges could not see, as judges in other
circuits have, the simple path of distinguishing software cases based on the
obvious limitations of lay judges and jurors in comprehending the foreign
languages of source code. Since the emergence of software copyright
infringement cases in the 1980s, substantially all software copyright cases have
employed expert witnesses to aid juries in understanding software code. As the
Second Circuit wisely recognized in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc.,229 the ordinary observer standard “may well have served its purpose when
the material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily comprehensible
and generally familiar to the average lay person,” but as to computer programs,
district courts must have “discretion . . . to decide to what extent, if any, expert

227. The Copyright Act of 1976, which went in effect on January 1, 1978, included
computer software in the class of “literary works.” See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); Menell, supra note
40, at 315–18 (discussing Congress’s vexed compromise to include computer software, written
work that serves functional purposes, within the copyright system).
228. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977).
229. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer programs, is
warranted in a given case.”230
The Ninth Circuit’s peculiar approach to the role of experts continues to
produce head-scratching results. On June 22, 2020, the court reversed a district
court’s dismissal of a copyright suit filed by the family of screenplay author
Paul Zindel alleging that Fox Searchlight Pictures’ The Shape of Water infringed
Zindel’s play Let Me Hear You Whisper.231 The court ruled that Zindel was
improperly denied the opportunity to present expert testimony regarding the
similarities of the works in question as part of the extrinsic test. The Ninth
Circuit apparently continues to believe that courts need help in assessing the
objective similarities between a play and a film, both of which are expressed in
English, but that courts do not need help from experts in understanding the
subjective differences in hexadecimal assembly language codes.
The time is long past due for the Ninth Circuit, home to many of the most
important software companies and the most significant software copyright
cases,232 to take the Krofft expert testimony rule en banc and rectify this “nutty”
rule to accord with the other circuits. Short of that, the Supreme Court should
either grant certiorari in a case raising this issue or simply remand such a case
to the Ninth Circuit for en banc review. Although this issue should not require
legislation, that remains an option to rectify and harmonize the national law
on this important issue.

230. Id. at 713.
231. See Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x. 158 (9th Cir. 2020).
232. See, e.g., Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Arista Networks, Inc., No. 14-cv-05344-BLF, 2016 WL
4440239 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1178
(N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015), rev’d, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 520
(2019); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Apple Comput., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 35 F.2d 1435
(9th Cir. 1994).

